Pages that link to "Item:Q2447152"
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The following pages link to The ``Boston'' school-choice mechanism: an axiomatic approach (Q2447152):
Displayed 15 items.
- An alternative characterization of top trading cycles (Q372362) (← links)
- New axioms for immediate acceptance (Q682464) (← links)
- Object allocation via immediate-acceptance: characterizations and an affirmative action application (Q1633670) (← links)
- Incompatibility between stability and consistency (Q1672771) (← links)
- Cognitive ability and games of school choice (Q1753282) (← links)
- Size versus fairness in the assignment problem (Q2343388) (← links)
- Minimal consistent enlargements of the immediate acceptance rule and the top trading cycles rule in school choice (Q2362200) (← links)
- New axioms for deferred acceptance (Q2397664) (← links)
- When preference misreporting is harm[less]ful? (Q2402812) (← links)
- Consistent strategy-proof assignment by hierarchical exchange (Q2447169) (← links)
- The strategic sincerity of approval voting (Q2447170) (← links)
- Characterizations of the sequential priority rules in the assignment of object types (Q2513285) (← links)
- Making just school assignments (Q2516227) (← links)
- Strategic schools under the Boston mechanism revisited (Q2628708) (← links)
- Alternative characterizations of Boston mechanism (Q2637851) (← links)