Pages that link to "Item:Q2447152"

The following pages link to The ``Boston'' school-choice mechanism: an axiomatic approach (Q2447152):

Displaying 37 items.

• An alternative characterization of top trading cycles (Q372362) (← links)
• New axioms for immediate acceptance (Q682464) (← links)
• Object allocation via immediate-acceptance: characterizations and an affirmative action application (Q1633670) (← links)
• Incompatibility between stability and consistency (Q1672771) (← links)
• Cognitive ability and games of school choice (Q1753282) (← links)
• Partial strategyproofness: relaxing strategyproofness for the random assignment problem (Q1995295) (← links)
• Stepwise ordinal efficiency for the random assignment problem (Q1996179) (← links)
• School choice: Nash implementation of stable matchings through rank-priority mechanisms (Q2051001) (← links)
• Ex-post favoring ranks: a fairness notion for the random assignment problem (Q2059097) (← links)
• Sequential school choice: theory and evidence from the field and lab (Q2067353) (← links)
• A new fairness notion in the assignment of indivisible resources (Q2108757) (← links)
• Serial dictatorship mechanisms with reservation prices (Q2206002) (← links)
• Evolution and Rawlsian social choice in matching (Q2206800) (← links)
• Strategy-proof improvements upon deferred acceptance: a maximal domain for possibility (Q2273939) (← links)
• Sequential versus simultaneous assignment systems and two applications (Q2323297) (← links)
• Top trading cycles, consistency, and acyclic priorities for house allocation with existing tenants (Q2334138) (← links)
• The modified Boston mechanism (Q2334829) (← links)
• Size versus fairness in the assignment problem (Q2343388) (← links)
• Minimal consistent enlargements of the immediate acceptance rule and the top trading cycles rule in school choice (Q2362200) (← links)
• New axioms for deferred acceptance (Q2397664) (← links)
• When preference misreporting is harm[less]ful? (Q2402812) (← links)
• Chinese college admissions and school choice reforms: an experimental study (Q2416636) (← links)
• Preference profiles for efficiency, fairness, and consistency in school choice problems (Q2424243) (← links)
• Consistent strategy-proof assignment by hierarchical exchange (Q2447169) (← links)
• The strategic sincerity of approval voting (Q2447170) (← links)
• Characterizations of the sequential priority rules in the assignment of object types (Q2513285) (← links)
• Making just school assignments (Q2516227) (← links)
• Strategic schools under the Boston mechanism revisited (Q2628708) (← links)
• Alternative characterizations of Boston mechanism (Q2637851) (← links)
• School choice with preference rank classes (Q2681516) (← links)
• Stability Representations of Many-to-One Matching Problems: An Integer Optimization Approach (Q5060805) (← links)
• Favoring Eagerness for Remaining Items: Designing Efficient, Fair, and Strategyproof Mechanisms (Q5881800) (← links)
• The object allocation problem with favoring upper ranks (Q6053622) (← links)
• When does an additional stage improve welfare in centralized assignment? (Q6063102) (← links)
• Balancing stability and efficiency in team formation as a generalized roommate problem (Q6078610) (← links)
• Constrained school choice: an experimental QRE analysis (Q6084802) (← links)
• Singles monotonicity and stability in one-to-one matching problems (Q6188681) (← links)