Pages that link to "Item:Q2452230"

The following pages link to A modified deferred acceptance algorithm for many-to-one matching markets with externalities among firms (Q2452230):

Displayed 8 items.

• Competitive equilibria in Shapley-Scarf markets with couples (Q776971) ‎ (← links)
• Labor market matching with ensuing competitive externalities in large economies (Q2019341) ‎ (← links)
• The roommate problem with externalities (Q2021792) ‎ (← links)
• Core and top trading cycles in a market with indivisible goods and externalities (Q2138371) ‎ (← links)
• Existence of stable allocations in matching markets with infinite contracts: a topological approach (Q2222218) ‎ (← links)
• Downstream competition and upstream labor market matching (Q2280043) ‎ (← links)
• Strategic Issues in One-to-One Matching with Externalities (Q5013394) ‎ (← links)
• Assortative matching with externalities and farsighted agents (Q6176200) ‎ (← links)