The following pages link to What are degrees of belief? (Q2454643):
Displaying 19 items.
- Rationality and indeterminate probabilities (Q383012) (← links)
- Belief without credence (Q516321) (← links)
- Eliciting uncertainties: a two structure approach (Q1653656) (← links)
- Probabilism, representation theorems, and whether deliberation crowds out prediction (Q1706798) (← links)
- Vague credence (Q1708891) (← links)
- Belief and certainty (Q1708909) (← links)
- The qualitative paradox of non-conglomerability (Q1709097) (← links)
- The nature of doubt and a new puzzle about belief, doubt, and confidence (Q1989971) (← links)
- On de Finetti's instrumentalist philosophy of probability (Q2289724) (← links)
- The interference problem for the betting interpretation of degrees of belief (Q2446045) (← links)
- The consistency argument for ranking functions (Q2454646) (← links)
- New foundations for counterfactuals (Q2515770) (← links)
- Belief, credence, and evidence (Q2690157) (← links)
- Credence as doxastic tendency (Q2690184) (← links)
- Betting against the Zen monk: on preferences and partial belief (Q2695167) (← links)
- Dr. Truthlove or: How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Love Bayesian Probabilities* (Q2965393) (← links)
- Context-sensitivity and the preface paradox for credence (Q6147158) (← links)
- How can representationalism accommodate degrees of belief? A dispositional representationalist proposal (Q6147186) (← links)
- Contra counterfactism (Q6182778) (← links)
