Pages that link to "Item:Q2482681"

The following pages link to Deferred acceptance algorithms: history, theory, practice, and open questions (Q2482681):

Displaying 50 items.

• Responsive affirmative action in school choice (Q308606) (← links)
• Matching couples with Scarf's algorithm (Q314433) (← links)
• Improved algorithmic results for unsplittable stable allocation problems (Q326457) (← links)
• Stable matchings of teachers to schools (Q329714) (← links)
• Improving schools through school choice: a market design approach (Q337801) (← links)
• An analysis of the German university admissions system (Q361830) (← links)
• Testing substitutability (Q423737) (← links)
• School choice: impossibilities for affirmative action (Q423742) (← links)
• Stability and strategy-proofness for college admissions with an eligibility criterion (Q490945) (← links)
• Contract design and stability in many-to-many matching (Q523005) (← links)
• Incentive compatibility for the stable matching model with an entrance criterion (Q532764) (← links)
• Median stable matching for markets with wages (Q533097) (← links)
• Core of coalition formation games and fixed-point methods (Q904830) (← links)
• Linkage based deferred acceptance optimization (Q1615653) (← links)
• Suboptimal behavior in strategy-proof mechanisms: evidence from the residency match (Q1651286) (← links)
• Matching with contracts, substitutes and two-unit demand (Q1668513) (← links)
• A marriage matching mechanism menagerie (Q1727951) (← links)
• The existence of a unique core partition in coalition formation games (Q1735811) (← links)
• Stability, optimality and manipulation in matching problems with weighted preferences (Q1736594) (← links)
• Stable marriage and roommates problems with restricted edges: complexity and approximability (Q1751156) (← links)
• The skipping-down strategy and stability in school choice problems with affirmative action: theory and experiment (Q1753287) (← links)
• Matching with indifferences: a comparison of algorithms in the context of course allocation (Q1753433) (← links)
• Designing matching mechanisms under constraints: an approach from discrete convex analysis (Q1757595) (← links)
• Manipulability in matching markets: conflict and coincidence of interests (Q1926598) (← links)
• Preferences and the price of stability in matching markets (Q1945450) (← links)
• Market structure and matching with contracts (Q1958951) (← links)
• An advanced parking navigation system for downtown parking (Q2005880) (← links)
• Uniqueness of \(DP\)-Nash subgraphs and \(D\)-sets in weighted graphs of Netflix games (Q2019479) (← links)
• Subgame perfect equilibria under the deferred acceptance algorithm (Q2041080) (← links)
• Improving efficiency in school choice under partial priorities (Q2051512) (← links)
• Bipartite choices (Q2105872) (← links)
• Consistency of the doctor-optimal equilibrium price vector in job-matching markets (Q2231426) (← links)
• Matching with preferences over colleagues solves classical matching (Q2268127) (← links)
• Refugee allocation in the setting of hedonic games (Q2290371) (← links)
• Improving schools through school choice: an experimental study of deferred acceptance (Q2292817) (← links)
• On the welfare effects of affirmative actions in school choice (Q2318120) (← links)
• ReGale: some memorable results (Q2389290) (← links)
• A dynamic school choice model (Q2435894) (← links)
• Equilibria under deferred acceptance: dropping strategies, filled positions, and welfare (Q2437848) (← links)
• The ``Boston'' school-choice mechanism: an axiomatic approach (Q2447152) (← links)
• Testing substitutability of weak preferences (Q2637415) (← links)
• The vigilant eating rule: a general approach for probabilistic economic design with constraints (Q2675446) (← links)
• MATCHING WITH COUPLES: A MULTIDISCIPLINARY SURVEY (Q2854007) (← links)
• Stable Marriage and Roommates Problems with Restricted Edges: Complexity and Approximability (Q3449578) (← links)
• Political mergers as coalition formation: An analysis of the<i>Heisei</i>municipal amalgamations (Q4586176) (← links)
• Strategy-proof tie-breaking in matching with priorities (Q4612461) (← links)
• An efficient implementation of the Gale and Shapley “propose-and-reject” algorithm (Q4957968) (← links)
• Deferred Acceptance with Compensation Chains (Q4994168) (← links)
• (Q5053286) (← links)
• Market Design (Q5150291) (← links)