Pages that link to "Item:Q2491032"
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The following pages link to On two competing mechanisms for priority-based allocation problems (Q2491032):
Displayed 50 items.
- Improving schools through school choice: a market design approach (Q337801) (← links)
- An alternative characterization of top trading cycles (Q372362) (← links)
- Local and global consistency properties for student placement (Q386062) (← links)
- The Pareto-dominant strategy-proof and fair rule for problems with indivisible goods (Q431227) (← links)
- The difference indifference makes in strategy-proof allocation of objects (Q449183) (← links)
- When is the Boston mechanism strategy-proof? (Q459157) (← links)
- A new perspective on Kesten's school choice with consent idea (Q472219) (← links)
- Singleton core in many-to-one matching problems (Q477777) (← links)
- On the operation of multiple matching markets (Q516981) (← links)
- Ex-ante fairness in the Boston and serial dictatorship mechanisms under pre-exam and post-exam preference submission (Q523008) (← links)
- Coalitional strategy-proofness and resource monotonicity for house allocation problems (Q532646) (← links)
- Group robust stability in matching markets (Q665110) (← links)
- Constrained school choice (Q840677) (← links)
- Why do popular mechanisms lack efficiency in random environments? (Q840694) (← links)
- Consistent house allocation (Q868626) (← links)
- Efficient assignment respecting priorities (Q972883) (← links)
- Gaming the deferred acceptance when message spaces are restricted (Q1642176) (← links)
- Mutually best matches (Q1650271) (← links)
- Stable and efficient resource allocation under weak priorities (Q1691346) (← links)
- The instability of matching with overconfident agents (Q1735759) (← links)
- Finding a stable matching under type-specific minimum quotas (Q1757561) (← links)
- On two kinds of manipulation for school choice problems (Q1762420) (← links)
- Acyclic priority profiles in school choice: characterizations (Q1996172) (← links)
- Resource allocation on the basis of priorities under multi-unit demand (Q2036905) (← links)
- On the equivalence of the Boston and top trading cycles school choice mechanisms (Q2060531) (← links)
- Nash implementation on the basis of general priorities (Q2078086) (← links)
- College assignment problems under constrained choice, private preferences, and risk aversion (Q2099060) (← links)
- When is the deferred acceptance mechanism responsive to priority-based affirmative action? (Q2125094) (← links)
- On stable and efficient mechanisms for priority-based allocation problems (Q2173093) (← links)
- Matching inequality and strategic behavior under the Boston mechanism: evidence from China's college admissions (Q2206795) (← links)
- The medium-run efficiency consequences of unfair school matching: evidence from Chinese college admissions (Q2236864) (← links)
- Strategy-proof improvements upon deferred acceptance: a maximal domain for possibility (Q2273939) (← links)
- On responsiveness of top trading cycles mechanism to priority-based affirmative action (Q2292744) (← links)
- Affirmative action under common school priorities: the top trading cycles mechanism case (Q2294296) (← links)
- On the welfare effects of affirmative actions in school choice (Q2318120) (← links)
- Sequential versus simultaneous assignment systems and two applications (Q2323297) (← links)
- Top trading cycles, consistency, and acyclic priorities for house allocation with existing tenants (Q2334138) (← links)
- Incentives in landing slot problems (Q2359379) (← links)
- Minimal consistent enlargements of the immediate acceptance rule and the top trading cycles rule in school choice (Q2362200) (← links)
- Competitive equilibrium and singleton cores in generalized matching problems (Q2398192) (← links)
- Strategy-proof school choice mechanisms with minimum quotas and initial endowments (Q2409677) (← links)
- Preference profiles for efficiency, fairness, and consistency in school choice problems (Q2424243) (← links)
- Matching mechanisms and matching quality: evidence from a top university in China (Q2442836) (← links)
- The ``Boston'' school-choice mechanism: an axiomatic approach (Q2447152) (← links)
- Fair and efficient student placement with couples (Q2458423) (← links)
- The stability of the equilibrium outcomes in the admission games induced by stable matching rules (Q2482680) (← links)
- Deferred acceptance algorithms: history, theory, practice, and open questions (Q2482681) (← links)
- Efficient priority rules (Q2506315) (← links)
- A necessary and sufficient condition for stable matching rules to be strategy-proof (Q2513288) (← links)
- Strategy-proof tie-breaking in matching with priorities (Q4612461) (← links)