Pages that link to "Item:Q2496786"

The following pages link to The communication requirements of efficient allocations and supporting prices (Q2496786):

Displaying 38 items.

• Efficient sets are small (Q392661) (← links)
• Minimizing the total weighted completion time of fully parallel jobs with integer parallel units (Q393040) (← links)
• Composition of semi-LTCs by two-wise tensor products (Q496304) (← links)
• Comparing multiagent systems research in combinatorial auctions and voting (Q616771) (← links)
• Auction design with costly preference elicitation (Q812389) (← links)
• An options-based solution to the sequential auction problem (Q835835) (← links)
• The communication cost of selfishness (Q840676) (← links)
• Ascending price Vickrey auctions for general valuations (Q869869) (← links)
• Inapproximability results for combinatorial auctions with submodular utility functions (Q943868) (← links)
• Informational limitations of ascending combinatorial auctions (Q972880) (← links)
• An efficient ascending auction for private valuations (Q1622372) (← links)
• Setting lower bounds on truthfulness (Q1651232) (← links)
• Gross substitutability: an algorithmic survey (Q1682734) (← links)
• Truthfulness with value-maximizing bidders: on the limits of approximation in combinatorial markets (Q1753496) (← links)
• Fraction auctions: the tradeoff between efficiency and running time (Q1926775) (← links)
• On the existence of Pareto efficient and envy-free allocations (Q2025008) (← links)
• Combinatorial auctions with endowment effect (Q2100637) (← links)
• Improved prophet inequalities for combinatorial welfare maximization with (approximately) subadditive agents (Q2237895) (← links)
• Introduction to computer science and economic theory (Q2253830) (← links)
• Multi-unit auctions: beyond Roberts (Q2253831) (← links)
• Economic efficiency requires interaction (Q2278948) (← links)
• Computing Walrasian equilibria: fast algorithms and structural properties (Q2288196) (← links)
• Fair by design: multidimensional envy-free mechanisms (Q2345204) (← links)
• Limitations of VCG-based mechanisms (Q2454572) (← links)
• The communication requirements of social choice rules and supporting budget sets (Q2455666) (← links)
• The communication complexity of private value single-item auctions (Q2480045) (← links)
• Combinatorial auctions (Q2480257) (← links)
• Combinatorial auctions with decreasing marginal utilities (Q2506310) (← links)
• Truthful approximation mechanisms for restricted combinatorial auctions (Q2519488) (← links)
• A Simple and Approximately Optimal Mechanism for a Buyer with Complements (Q4994150) (← links)
• When Are Welfare Guarantees Robust (Q5002625) (← links)
• Optimally Deceiving a Learning Leader in Stackelberg Games (Q5026202) (← links)
• (Q5874555) (← links)
• (Q6087211) (← links)
• A Dual Approach for Dynamic Pricing in Multidemand Markets (Q6116232) (← links)
• Strong substitutes: structural properties, and a new algorithm for competitive equilibrium prices (Q6120905) (← links)
• Computational implementation (Q6156322) (← links)
• A characterization of the existence of succinct linear representation of subset-valuations (Q6167805) (← links)