Pages that link to "Item:Q2637851"
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The following pages link to Alternative characterizations of Boston mechanism (Q2637851):
Displaying 10 items.
- New axioms for immediate acceptance (Q682464) (← links)
- Object allocation via immediate-acceptance: characterizations and an affirmative action application (Q1633670) (← links)
- The modified Boston mechanism (Q2334829) (← links)
- New axioms for deferred acceptance (Q2397664) (← links)
- When preference misreporting is harm[less]ful? (Q2402812) (← links)
- The ``Boston'' school-choice mechanism: an axiomatic approach (Q2447152) (← links)
- School choice with preference rank classes (Q2681516) (← links)
- New axioms for top trading cycles (Q6066263) (← links)
- Singles monotonicity and stability in one-to-one matching problems (Q6188681) (← links)
- A characterization of the top trading cycles mechanism for the school choice problem (Q6575517) (← links)
