Pages that link to "Item:Q2867517"

The following pages link to On Partially Honest Nash Implementation in Private Good Economies with Restricted Domains: A Sufficient Condition (Q2867517):

Displayed 9 items.

• On Nash implementability in allotment economies under domain restrictions with indifference (Q1675038) ‎ (← links)
• Strong implementation with partially honest individuals (Q1800965) ‎ (← links)
• Implementation in undominated strategies with partially honest agents (Q2013373) ‎ (← links)
• Double implementation without no-veto-power (Q2334843) ‎ (← links)
• Nash implementation in private good economies with single-plateaued preferences and in matching problems (Q2343805) ‎ (← links)
• Nash implementation in an allocation problem with single-dipped preferences (Q2351207) ‎ (← links)
• Bayesian implementation with partially honest individuals (Q2513286) ‎ (← links)
• On Partially Honest Nash Implementation in Private Good Economies with Restricted Domains: A Sufficient Condition (Q2867517) ‎ (← links)
• Binary mechanism for the allocation problem with single-dipped preferences (Q6168816) ‎ (← links)