Pages that link to "Item:Q3410705"
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The following pages link to The Limits of ex post Implementation (Q3410705):
Displayed 39 items.
- On the importance of uniform sharing rules for efficient matching (Q308609) (← links)
- Incentive compatible market design with applications (Q495753) (← links)
- Dynamic mechanism design with interdependent valuations (Q497945) (← links)
- Optimal allocation of an indivisible good (Q516975) (← links)
- The robustness of robust implementation (Q643278) (← links)
- Locally robust implementation and its limits (Q694745) (← links)
- Ascending price Vickrey auctions for general valuations (Q869869) (← links)
- On existence of ex post Nash consistent representation for effectivity functions (Q892845) (← links)
- Efficient assignment with interdependent values (Q896937) (← links)
- Strategic and structural uncertainty in robust implementation (Q900423) (← links)
- Ex post implementation (Q932807) (← links)
- Ex-post implementation and preference aggregation via potentials (Q957859) (← links)
- Efficient allocation of heterogeneous commodities with balanced transfers (Q976966) (← links)
- The generalized random priority mechanism with budgets (Q1622384) (← links)
- Conditions for incentive compatibility in models with multidimensional allocation functions and one-dimensional types (Q1929140) (← links)
- Posterior implementation vs ex-post implementation (Q1934151) (← links)
- Revealed reasoning (Q2067387) (← links)
- Restricted environments and incentive compatibility in interdependent values models (Q2078029) (← links)
- Ex-post incentive compatible and individually rational assignments in housing markets with interdependent values (Q2222222) (← links)
- Ex-post implementation with social preferences (Q2235086) (← links)
- On the uniqueness of Groves mechanisms and the payoff equivalence principle (Q2268126) (← links)
- Merger negotiations and ex-post regret (Q2271375) (← links)
- Evidence reading mechanisms (Q2325665) (← links)
- An ascending auction with multi-dimensional signals (Q2334127) (← links)
- Incentives and justice for sequencing problems (Q2403448) (← links)
- Efficient ex post implementable auctions and English auctions for bidders with non-quasilinear preferences (Q2425157) (← links)
- Optimal mechanism design for the private supply of a public good (Q2435905) (← links)
- Finite supermodular design with interdependent valuations (Q2437825) (← links)
- No externalities: a characterization of efficiency and incentive compatibility with public goods (Q2450141) (← links)
- A strict ex-post incentive compatible mechanism for interdependent valuations (Q2451422) (← links)
- Implementation in an interdependent value framework (Q2452816) (← links)
- Mechanism design with multidimensional, continuous types and interdependent valuations (Q2455672) (← links)
- On mechanisms eliciting ordinal preferences (Q4612470) (← links)
- Mechanism Design (Q5149740) (← links)
- Robust virtual implementation under common strong belief in rationality (Q5963306) (← links)
- The limits of ex post implementation without transfers (Q6076897) (← links)
- Continuous implementation with payoff knowledge (Q6163291) (← links)
- Voting with interdependent values: the Condorcet winner (Q6188243) (← links)
- Ex-post implementation with interdependent values (Q6188260) (← links)