The following pages link to A Theory of Credibility (Q3685519):
Displaying 39 items.
- Competition, preference uncertainty, and jamming: a strategic communication experiment (Q263383) (← links)
- Costly information transmission in continuous time with implications for credit rating announcements (Q310932) (← links)
- Bounded memory and permanent reputations (Q392656) (← links)
- Limited records and reputation bubbles (Q402059) (← links)
- Dynamic strategic information transmission (Q402084) (← links)
- Optimal policy with credibility concerns (Q405540) (← links)
- Learning with bounded memory in games (Q485768) (← links)
- Multi-period competitive cheap talk with highly biased experts (Q523488) (← links)
- Perturbed communication games with honest senders and naive receivers (Q533083) (← links)
- Informal communication (Q707291) (← links)
- Evolving influence: mitigating extreme conflicts of interest in advisory relationships (Q738930) (← links)
- Talking to influence (Q777718) (← links)
- Naive audience and communication bias (Q863401) (← links)
- Comparative cheap talk (Q869851) (← links)
- Effective cheap talk with conflicting interests (Q909587) (← links)
- Who benefits from a sender's credibility concern, the sender or a receiver? (Q1046275) (← links)
- Cheap talk can matter in bargaining (Q1263539) (← links)
- Starting small and renegotiation (Q1289252) (← links)
- Preselection and expert advice (Q1677246) (← links)
- How does communication affect beliefs in one-shot games with complete information? (Q1691357) (← links)
- Communication is more than information sharing: the role of status-relevant knowledge (Q1735778) (← links)
- Receiver's dilemma (Q1745660) (← links)
- Stag hunt with unknown outside options (Q2059062) (← links)
- Starting small to communicate (Q2173403) (← links)
- Crying about a strategic wolf: a theory of crime and warning (Q2211485) (← links)
- Incentive constraints in games with bounded memory (Q2248909) (← links)
- A mathematical model of communication with reputational concerns (Q2314726) (← links)
- Credulity, lies, and costly talk (Q2373768) (← links)
- Too good to be truthful: why competent advisers are fired (Q2415994) (← links)
- When mandatory disclosure hurts: Expert advice and conflicting interests (Q2475171) (← links)
- Professional advice (Q2490126) (← links)
- Building trust: the costs and benefits of gradualism (Q2667253) (← links)
- De-biasing strategic communication (Q2667271) (← links)
- Starting small in project choice: a discrete-time setting with a continuum of types (Q2675395) (← links)
- A reputation for honesty (Q2675407) (← links)
- Cheap talk with multiple experts and uncertain biases (Q2690357) (← links)
- Signaling Games (Q5149736) (← links)
- Repeated communication with private lying costs (Q6166489) (← links)
- The battle of opinion: dynamic information revelation by ideological senders (Q6168256) (← links)
