Pages that link to "Item:Q3877366"
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The following pages link to Bureaucrats Versus Voters: On the Political Economy of Resource Allocation by Direct Democracy (Q3877366):
Displaying 13 items.
- Efficiency of flexible budgetary institutions (Q503055) (← links)
- Strategic versus non-strategic voting power in the EU council of ministers: the consultation procedure (Q649129) (← links)
- Markovian equilibria in dynamic spatial legislative bargaining: existence with three players (Q738942) (← links)
- Optimal coalition size when making proposals is costly (Q922257) (← links)
- Strategic voting in repeated referenda (Q1097821) (← links)
- Reputational dynamics in spatial competition (Q1119456) (← links)
- Incumbent reputations and ideological campaign contributions in spatial competition (Q1200899) (← links)
- Further implications of the reversion level in agenda-setter models (Q1352251) (← links)
- Personal power dynamics in bargaining (Q2095258) (← links)
- On single-peaked domains and min-max rules (Q2417386) (← links)
- EVALUATING THE SOCIAL OPTIMALITY OF DURABLE PUBLIC GOOD PROVISION USING THE HOUSING PRICE RESPONSE TO PUBLIC INVESTMENT (Q2980198) (← links)
- Leadership ability and agenda choice (Q6188242) (← links)
- Sequential veto bargaining with incomplete information (Q6536584) (← links)
