Pages that link to "Item:Q4620029"
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The following pages link to MATCHING MARKETS WITH MIXED OWNERSHIP: THE CASE FOR A REAL‐LIFE ASSIGNMENT MECHANISM* (Q4620029):
Displaying 15 items.
- An analysis of the German university admissions system (Q361830) (← links)
- An experimental study on the incentives of the probabilistic serial mechanism (Q485790) (← links)
- Matching with property rights: an application to Korean teacher transfer program (Q2059096) (← links)
- Weak stability and Pareto efficiency in school choice (Q2061119) (← links)
- Interdistrict school choice: a theory of student assignment (Q2138086) (← links)
- Strategy-proof improvements upon deferred acceptance: a maximal domain for possibility (Q2273939) (← links)
- Sequential versus simultaneous assignment systems and two applications (Q2323297) (← links)
- Incentives in landing slot problems (Q2359379) (← links)
- A dynamic school choice model (Q2435894) (← links)
- Implementing quotas in university admissions: an experimental analysis (Q2442854) (← links)
- Strategyproof allocation mechanisms with endowments and M-convex distributional constraints (Q2680800) (← links)
- Reallocation with priorities and minimal envy mechanisms (Q6074836) (← links)
- Non-vetoed matching with status quo (Q6121906) (← links)
- Housing markets since Shapley and Scarf (Q6121908) (← links)
- Reallocation with priorities (Q6188682) (← links)
