Pages that link to "Item:Q4682746"
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The following pages link to Stability and strategy-proofness for matching with constraints: A necessary and sufficient condition (Q4682746):
Displayed 16 items.
- On the correspondence of contracts to salaries in (many-to-many) matching (Q423776) (← links)
- Stability concepts in matching under distributional constraints (Q508390) (← links)
- Lone wolves in infinite, discrete matching markets (Q1651278) (← links)
- Finding a stable matching under type-specific minimum quotas (Q1757561) (← links)
- Slot-specific priorities with capacity transfers (Q2049501) (← links)
- Interdistrict school choice: a theory of student assignment (Q2138086) (← links)
- Entering classes in the college admissions model (Q2212783) (← links)
- The equivalence between costly and probabilistic voting models (Q2435899) (← links)
- Menu mechanisms (Q2675411) (← links)
- School choice with preference rank classes (Q2681516) (← links)
- Market Design (Q5150291) (← links)
- Refined computational complexities of hospitals/residents problem with regional caps (Q6113860) (← links)
- Cutoff stability under distributional constraints with an application to summer internship matching (Q6120933) (← links)
- Fairness under affirmative action policies with overlapping reserves (Q6146437) (← links)
- Student-optimal interdistrict school choice: district-based versus school-based admissions (Q6188257) (← links)
- Refined computational complexities of hospitals/residents problem with regional caps (Q6201324) (← links)