The following pages link to One-dimensional mechanism design (Q4682769):
Displayed 7 items.
- Groupstrategyproofness of the egalitarian mechanism for constrained rationing problems (Q1680106) (← links)
- Incentive compatibility and strategy-proofness of mechanisms of organizational behavior control: retrospective, state of the art, and prospects of theoretical research (Q1982858) (← links)
- Extended random assignment mechanisms on a family of good sets (Q2241324) (← links)
- A simple construction of complete single-peaked domains by recursive tiling (Q2283307) (← links)
- Strategy-proof group selection under single-peaked preferences over group size (Q2294116) (← links)
- Submodular optimization views on the random assignment problem (Q2330658) (← links)
- All sequential allotment rules are obviously strategy‐proof (Q6076917) (← links)