Pages that link to "Item:Q495753"
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The following pages link to Incentive compatible market design with applications (Q495753):
Displaying 9 items.
- On the importance of uniform sharing rules for efficient matching (Q308609) (← links)
- Two-sided allocation problems, decomposability, and the impossibility of efficient trade (Q1757552) (← links)
- Ex-post incentive compatible and individually rational assignments in housing markets with interdependent values (Q2222222) (← links)
- Balanced implementability of sequencing rules (Q2278931) (← links)
- The impossibility of strategy-proof, Pareto efficient, and individually rational rules for fractional matching (Q2291153) (← links)
- The deficit on each trade in a Vickrey double auction is at least as large as the Walrasian price gap (Q2338660) (← links)
- Balanced ranking mechanisms (Q2411515) (← links)
- Pricing in position auctions and online advertising (Q2636854) (← links)
- Worst-case efficient and budget-balanced mechanism for single-object allocation with interdependent values (Q6541011) (← links)
