Pages that link to "Item:Q508382"
From MaRDI portal
The following pages link to On stable and strategy-proof rules in matching markets with contracts (Q508382):
Displaying 10 items.
- Characterizations of the cumulative offer process (Q682475) (← links)
- Unilateral substitutability is necessary for doctor-optimal stability (Q1984462) (← links)
- Graduate admission with financial support (Q1985735) (← links)
- Group incentive compatibility and welfare for matching with contracts (Q2036921) (← links)
- Nash implementation on the basis of general priorities (Q2078086) (← links)
- Equivalence theorem in matching with contracts (Q2128949) (← links)
- Equivalent choice functions and stable mechanisms (Q2206798) (← links)
- Strategy-proof Pareto-improvement (Q2415985) (← links)
- Strategy-proof allocation with outside option (Q2681500) (← links)
- Strategic behavior in one-to-one matching markets without outside options (Q6665686) (← links)
