Pages that link to "Item:Q523008"
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The following pages link to Ex-ante fairness in the Boston and serial dictatorship mechanisms under pre-exam and post-exam preference submission (Q523008):
Displaying 9 items.
- Epsilon-stability in school choice (Q1697834) (← links)
- The instability of matching with overconfident agents (Q1735759) (← links)
- Assignment mechanisms: common preferences and information acquisition (Q2067372) (← links)
- Matching inequality and strategic behavior under the Boston mechanism: evidence from China's college admissions (Q2206795) (← links)
- High school admission reform in China: a welfare analysis (Q2218558) (← links)
- Manipulability in school choice (Q2231403) (← links)
- The medium-run efficiency consequences of unfair school matching: evidence from Chinese college admissions (Q2236864) (← links)
- Self-selection in school choice (Q2273935) (← links)
- Optimal assignment mechanisms with imperfect verification (Q6076910) (← links)
