The following pages link to On optimal single-item auctions (Q5419081):
Displayed 12 items.
- Tractable stochastic analysis in high dimensions via robust optimization (Q715242) (← links)
- On the complexity of dynamic mechanism design (Q2155909) (← links)
- Reverse auctions are different from auctions (Q2414048) (← links)
- Optimal mechanism design for the private supply of a public good (Q2435905) (← links)
- Revenue maximization in a Bayesian double auction market (Q2453118) (← links)
- Approximately optimal auctions for correlated bidders (Q2516248) (← links)
- Revenue Maximization for Market Intermediation with Correlated Priors (Q2819465) (← links)
- Limitations of Deterministic Auction Design for Correlated Bidders (Q2849317) (← links)
- Auction Design with a Revenue Target (Q3449588) (← links)
- Worst-Case Mechanism Design via Bayesian Analysis (Q4978196) (← links)
- Optimal Design for Multi-Item Auctions: A Robust Optimization Approach (Q5247609) (← links)
- Lookahead auctions with pooling (Q6164500) (← links)