Pages that link to "Item:Q665110"
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The following pages link to Group robust stability in matching markets (Q665110):
Displaying 9 items.
- Application fee manipulations in matching markets (Q393269) (← links)
- Fictitious students creation incentives in school choice problems (Q403704) (← links)
- When is the Boston mechanism strategy-proof? (Q459157) (← links)
- Group stability in matching with interdependent values (Q490943) (← links)
- Three-sided stable matching problem with two of them as cooperative partners (Q1740415) (← links)
- Three-sided matching problem with mixed preferences (Q2060065) (← links)
- On the equivalence of the Boston and top trading cycles school choice mechanisms (Q2060531) (← links)
- Complexity study for the robust stable marriage problem (Q2419115) (← links)
- New axioms for top trading cycles (Q6066263) (← links)
