Pages that link to "Item:Q705875"

The following pages link to The value of commitment in Stackelberg games with observation costs (Q705875):

Displaying 10 items.

• Robust solutions to Stackelberg games: addressing bounded rationality and limited observations in human cognition (Q622107) (← links)
• Strategic sourcing for entry deterrence and tacit collusion (Q633772) (← links)
• An experimental study of commitment in Stackelberg games with observation costs (Q705876) (← links)
• Noisy leadership: An experimental approach (Q863265) (← links)
• The value of commitment in contests and tournaments when observation is costly (Q926789) (← links)
• Commitment, first-mover-, and second-mover advantage (Q943881) (← links)
• Commitment and observability in a contracting environment (Q2389297) (← links)
• Cournot and Stackelberg equilibrium under strategic delegation: an equivalence result (Q2404219) (← links)
• Effects of strategic choices for the postmerger manufacturer on supply chain members (Q2669889) (← links)
• STRATEGIC DELEGATION IN A STACKELBERG GAME WITH MULTIPLE STAGES (Q3166240) (← links)