The following pages link to Constrained school choice (Q840677):
Displaying 50 items.
- Improving schools through school choice: a market design approach (Q337801) (← links)
- An analysis of the German university admissions system (Q361830) (← links)
- Dominant strategy implementation of stable rules (Q417718) (← links)
- Singleton core in many-to-one matching problems (Q477777) (← links)
- On the existence of a strictly strong Nash equilibrium under the student-optimal deferred acceptance algorithm (Q485776) (← links)
- Ex-ante fairness in the Boston and serial dictatorship mechanisms under pre-exam and post-exam preference submission (Q523008) (← links)
- An efficiency theorem for incompletely known preferences (Q617691) (← links)
- A further note on the college admission game (Q662278) (← links)
- Decentralized college admissions under single application (Q826044) (← links)
- Constrained school choice (Q840677) (← links)
- Games of school choice under the Boston mechanism with general priority structures (Q944257) (← links)
- Gaming the deferred acceptance when message spaces are restricted (Q1642176) (← links)
- Stability and the immediate acceptance rule when school priorities are weak (Q1684126) (← links)
- Stable and efficient resource allocation under weak priorities (Q1691346) (← links)
- Static versus dynamic deferred acceptance in school choice: theory and experiment (Q1735739) (← links)
- Finding a stable matching under type-specific minimum quotas (Q1757561) (← links)
- On two kinds of manipulation for school choice problems (Q1762420) (← links)
- Acyclic priority profiles in school choice: characterizations (Q1996172) (← links)
- Nash implementation of constrained efficient stable matchings under weak priorities (Q2013344) (← links)
- Level-k reasoning in school choice (Q2031184) (← links)
- Resource allocation on the basis of priorities under multi-unit demand (Q2036905) (← links)
- Subgame perfect equilibria under the deferred acceptance algorithm (Q2041080) (← links)
- School choice: Nash implementation of stable matchings through rank-priority mechanisms (Q2051001) (← links)
- On the equivalence of the Boston and top trading cycles school choice mechanisms (Q2060531) (← links)
- Nash implementation on the basis of general priorities (Q2078086) (← links)
- College assignment problems under constrained choice, private preferences, and risk aversion (Q2099060) (← links)
- When is the deferred acceptance mechanism responsive to priority-based affirmative action? (Q2125094) (← links)
- On stable and efficient mechanisms for priority-based allocation problems (Q2173093) (← links)
- Matching strategies of heterogeneous agents under incomplete information in a university clearinghouse (Q2173416) (← links)
- What you don't know can help you in school assignment (Q2178019) (← links)
- University rankings from the revealed preferences of the applicants (Q2184118) (← links)
- Matching inequality and strategic behavior under the Boston mechanism: evidence from China's college admissions (Q2206795) (← links)
- High school admission reform in China: a welfare analysis (Q2218558) (← links)
- Manipulability in school choice (Q2231403) (← links)
- The medium-run efficiency consequences of unfair school matching: evidence from Chinese college admissions (Q2236864) (← links)
- Self-selection in school choice (Q2273935) (← links)
- Strategy-proof improvements upon deferred acceptance: a maximal domain for possibility (Q2273939) (← links)
- Affirmative action under common school priorities: the top trading cycles mechanism case (Q2294296) (← links)
- On the welfare effects of affirmative actions in school choice (Q2318120) (← links)
- Sequential versus simultaneous assignment systems and two applications (Q2323297) (← links)
- Matching and chatting: an experimental study of the impact of network communication on school-matching mechanisms (Q2357813) (← links)
- Strategy-proof school choice mechanisms with minimum quotas and initial endowments (Q2409677) (← links)
- Assigning more students to their top choices: a comparison of tie-breaking rules (Q2416641) (← links)
- Preference profiles for efficiency, fairness, and consistency in school choice problems (Q2424243) (← links)
- Efficient resource allocation under multi-unit demand (Q2437801) (← links)
- Matching mechanisms and matching quality: evidence from a top university in China (Q2442836) (← links)
- The ``Boston'' school-choice mechanism: an axiomatic approach (Q2447152) (← links)
- A necessary and sufficient condition for stable matching rules to be strategy-proof (Q2513288) (← links)
- Criteria to compare mechanisms that partially satisfy a property: an axiomatic study (Q2673787) (← links)
- When does an additional stage improve welfare in centralized assignment? (Q6063102) (← links)
