Pages that link to "Item:Q848607"
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The following pages link to Two-sided matching with interdependent values (Q848607):
Displayed 19 items.
- On the importance of uniform sharing rules for efficient matching (Q308609) (← links)
- Group stability in matching with interdependent values (Q490943) (← links)
- Stability with one-sided incomplete information (Q508409) (← links)
- Paths to stability in two-sided matching under uncertainty (Q521877) (← links)
- Group robust stability in matching markets (Q665110) (← links)
- Matching markets under (in)complete information (Q894021) (← links)
- Efficient assignment with interdependent values (Q896937) (← links)
- Assignment mechanisms: common preferences and information acquisition (Q2067372) (← links)
- Decision-making with reference information (Q2154380) (← links)
- On the non-existence of stable matches with incomplete information (Q2178025) (← links)
- Ex-post incentive compatible and individually rational assignments in housing markets with interdependent values (Q2222222) (← links)
- Self-selection in school choice (Q2273935) (← links)
- A dynamic school choice model (Q2435894) (← links)
- Disclosure of information in matching markets with non-transferable utility (Q2437811) (← links)
- Incentive compatibility and feasibility constraints in housing markets (Q2453416) (← links)
- Lazy Gale-Shapley for many-to-one matching with partial information (Q2695460) (← links)
- The Marriage Problem with Interdependent Preferences (Q5149578) (← links)
- Market Design (Q5150291) (← links)
- Stable matching under forward‐induction reasoning (Q6059561) (← links)