Pages that link to "Item:Q848608"
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The following pages link to Incentives in the probabilistic serial mechanism (Q848608):
Displaying 43 items.
- Convex strategyproofness with an application to the probabilistic serial mechanism (Q284366) (← links)
- Assignment problems with complementarities (Q308621) (← links)
- An equilibrium analysis of the probabilistic serial mechanism (Q328558) (← links)
- Improving schools through school choice: a market design approach (Q337801) (← links)
- Strategy-proof stochastic assignment (Q402069) (← links)
- Fictitious students creation incentives in school choice problems (Q403704) (← links)
- An experimental study on the incentives of the probabilistic serial mechanism (Q485790) (← links)
- Assigning agents to a line (Q485809) (← links)
- When is the probabilistic serial assignment uniquely efficient and envy-free? (Q504391) (← links)
- Strategy-proof and fair assignment is wasteful (Q738936) (← links)
- The probabilistic serial mechanism with private endowments (Q980972) (← links)
- Probabilistic assignment: an extension approach (Q1649093) (← links)
- The object allocation problem with random priorities (Q1651226) (← links)
- Matching in the large: an experimental study (Q1651242) (← links)
- Impossibilities for probabilistic assignment (Q1697833) (← links)
- A note on ex-ante stable lotteries (Q1787357) (← links)
- Partial strategyproofness: relaxing strategyproofness for the random assignment problem (Q1995295) (← links)
- Non-manipulability of uniform price auctions with a large number of objects (Q2002068) (← links)
- Tight social welfare approximation of probabilistic serial (Q2089061) (← links)
- Constrained random matching (Q2155237) (← links)
- Random assignments on sequentially dichotomous domains (Q2173423) (← links)
- Reassignment-proof rules for land rental problems (Q2178644) (← links)
- Welfare theorems for random assignments with priorities (Q2212739) (← links)
- Random matching under priorities: stability and no envy concepts (Q2325654) (← links)
- The losses from integration in matching markets can be large (Q2328512) (← links)
- Submodular optimization views on the random assignment problem (Q2330658) (← links)
- Random assignments on preference domains with a tier structure (Q2338670) (← links)
- Fairness and efficiency in strategy-proof object allocation mechanisms (Q2359384) (← links)
- Efficient lottery design (Q2362194) (← links)
- The welfare effects of pre-arrangements in matching markets (Q2376989) (← links)
- Efficient resource allocation under multi-unit demand (Q2437801) (← links)
- The ``Boston'' school-choice mechanism: an axiomatic approach (Q2447152) (← links)
- Probabilistic assignment of indivisible goods with single-peaked preferences (Q2453443) (← links)
- Making just school assignments (Q2516227) (← links)
- Stability in Large Matching Markets with Complementarities (Q2931695) (← links)
- Stable Matching in Large Economies (Q5225243) (← links)
- Axiomatic characterizations of the constrained probabilistic serial mechanism (Q6054914) (← links)
- Optimal assignment mechanisms with imperfect verification (Q6076910) (← links)
- Strategy-proof and envy-free mechanisms for house allocation (Q6090447) (← links)
- On wastefulness of random assignments in discrete allocation problems (Q6113818) (← links)
- Ordinal Bayesian incentive compatibility in random assignment model (Q6156325) (← links)
- A planner-optimal matching mechanism and its incentive compatibility in a restricted domain (Q6176744) (← links)
- Reallocation with priorities (Q6188682) (← links)
