Pages that link to "Item:Q860356"

The following pages link to A solution to the random assignment problem on the full preference domain (Q860356):

Displaying 50 items.

• Convex strategyproofness with an application to the probabilistic serial mechanism (Q284366) (← links)
• An equilibrium analysis of the probabilistic serial mechanism (Q328558) (← links)
• Probabilistic assignment problem with multi-unit demands: a generalization of the serial rule and its characterization (Q462853) (← links)
• Assigning agents to a line (Q485809) (← links)
• A characterization of the extended serial correspondence (Q492874) (← links)
• When is the probabilistic serial assignment uniquely efficient and envy-free? (Q504391) (← links)
• Popular mixed matchings (Q541674) (← links)
• Efficiency under a combination of ordinal and cardinal information on preferences (Q553528) (← links)
• House allocation with fractional endowments (Q637577) (← links)
• Universal Pareto dominance and welfare for plausible utility functions (Q745015) (← links)
• Why do popular mechanisms lack efficiency in random environments? (Q840694) (← links)
• Incentives in the probabilistic serial mechanism (Q848608) (← links)
• Random assignment: redefining the serial rule (Q896952) (← links)
• Fair assignment of indivisible objects under ordinal preferences (Q899158) (← links)
• A constructive proof of the ordinal efficiency welfare theorem (Q938066) (← links)
• Random assignment of multiple indivisible objects (Q1005770) (← links)
• Random assignment under weak preferences (Q1021614) (← links)
• The generalized random priority mechanism with budgets (Q1622384) (← links)
• Probabilistic assignment: an extension approach (Q1649093) (← links)
• On the tradeoff between efficiency and strategyproofness (Q1651219) (← links)
• The object allocation problem with random priorities (Q1651226) (← links)
• Probabilistic assignment of indivisible objects when agents have the same preferences except the ordinal ranking of one object (Q1680102) (← links)
• Computational aspects of assigning agents to a line (Q1680103) (← links)
• Impossibilities for probabilistic assignment (Q1697833) (← links)
• A new ex-ante efficiency criterion and implications for the probabilistic serial mechanism (Q1753688) (← links)
• A note on the assignment problem with uniform preferences (Q1785360) (← links)
• Incompatibility of efficiency and strategyproofness in the random assignment setting with indifferences (Q1786741) (← links)
• Assigning papers to referees (Q1959732) (← links)
• Constrained random matching (Q2155237) (← links)
• Multi-unit assignment under dichotomous preferences (Q2173167) (← links)
• Extended random assignment mechanisms on a family of good sets (Q2241324) (← links)
• Short trading cycles: paired kidney exchange with strict ordinal preferences (Q2306268) (← links)
• Submodular optimization views on the random assignment problem (Q2330658) (← links)
• Efficient rules for probabilistic assignment (Q2338661) (← links)
• Size versus fairness in the assignment problem (Q2343388) (← links)
• A graph theoretic approach to the slot allocation problem (Q2362198) (← links)
• A note on object allocation under lexicographic preferences (Q2441234) (← links)
• Probabilistic assignment of indivisible goods with single-peaked preferences (Q2453443) (← links)
• The extended serial correspondence on a rich preference domain (Q2453497) (← links)
• Random serial dictatorship and ordinally efficient contracts (Q2482677) (← links)
• Beyond the worst-case analysis of random priority: smoothed and average-case approximation ratios in mechanism design (Q2672280) (← links)
• The vigilant eating rule: a general approach for probabilistic economic design with constraints (Q2675446) (← links)
• Multi resource allocation with partial preferences (Q2680798) (← links)
• Social Welfare in One-Sided Matching Markets without Money (Q3088085) (← links)
• On mechanisms eliciting ordinal preferences (Q4612470) (← links)
• Popularity, Mixed Matchings, and Self-Duality (Q5000640) (← links)
• Fairness in Influence Maximization through Randomization (Q5076357) (← links)
• Assignment Mechanisms Under Distributional Constraints (Q5131470) (← links)
• Favoring Eagerness for Remaining Items: Designing Efficient, Fair, and Strategyproof Mechanisms (Q5881800) (← links)
• Efficiency and stability of probabilistic assignments in marriage problems (Q5964688) (← links)