Pages that link to "Item:Q862542"
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The following pages link to On the average minimum size of a manipulating coalition (Q862542):
Displaying 10 items.
- Democratic elections and centralized decisions: Condorcet and approval voting compared with median and coverage locations (Q323149) (← links)
- Is it ever safe to vote strategically? (Q404772) (← links)
- Dichotomy for voting systems (Q859982) (← links)
- Asymptotics of the minimum manipulating coalition size for positional voting rules under impartial culture behaviour (Q1042332) (← links)
- How large should a coalition be to manipulate an election? (Q1887542) (← links)
- A probabilistic evaluation framework for preference aggregation reflecting group homogeneity (Q2317999) (← links)
- Exact results on manipulability of positional voting rules (Q2385127) (← links)
- Gains from manipulating social choice rules (Q2391056) (← links)
- Minimal manipulability: unanimity and nondictatorship (Q2641999) (← links)
- Smoothed analysis of social choice revisited (Q6609149) (← links)