Pages that link to "Item:Q898694"

The following pages link to Welfare-maximizing assignment of agents to hierarchical positions (Q898694):

Displayed 8 items.

• Improving schools through school choice: a market design approach (Q337801) ‎ (← links)
• A marriage matching mechanism menagerie (Q1727951) ‎ (← links)
• Continuity and incentive compatibility in cardinal mechanisms (Q2178581) ‎ (← links)
• Welfare maximizing allocation without transfers (Q2208881) ‎ (← links)
• Foundations of pseudomarkets: Walrasian equilibria for discrete resources (Q2231384) ‎ (← links)
• Optimal assignment mechanisms with imperfect verification (Q6076910) ‎ (← links)
• Inefficiency of random serial dictatorship under incomplete information (Q6090465) ‎ (← links)
• Selecting a winner with external referees (Q6133347) ‎ (← links)