Pages that link to "Item:Q926882"
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The following pages link to Does monitoring decrease work effort? The complementarity between agency and crowding-out theories (Q926882):
Displayed 7 items.
- Goal setting in the principal-agent model: weak incentives for strong performance (Q1753293) (← links)
- Incentives and group identity (Q2016214) (← links)
- Peers or police?: the effect of choice and type of monitoring in the provision of public goods (Q2206809) (← links)
- The timing of discretionary bonuses -- effort, signals, and reciprocity (Q2212756) (← links)
- When punishment fails: Research on sanctions, intentions and non-cooperation (Q2427127) (← links)
- Monitored by your friends, not your foes: strategic ignorance and the delegation of real authority (Q2442858) (← links)
- FRAMING OF INCENTIVES AND EFFORT PROVISION (Q3459213) (← links)