The following pages link to A commitment folk theorem (Q972132):
Displaying 18 items.
- Feasibility and individual rationality in two-person Bayesian games (Q267078) (← links)
- Dynamic commitment games, efficiency and coordination (Q281391) (← links)
- Program equilibrium -- a program reasoning approach (Q361805) (← links)
- Codes of conduct, private information and repeated games (Q524971) (← links)
- Mediators in position auctions (Q834851) (← links)
- Reciprocal contracting (Q896940) (← links)
- Evolutionary stability of discrimination under observability (Q1036581) (← links)
- Game theory with translucent players (Q1621735) (← links)
- Competing mechanisms and folk theorems: two examples (Q1995461) (← links)
- Regular equilibria and negative welfare implications in delegation games (Q2099017) (← links)
- Dynamic information design: a simple problem on optimal sequential information disclosure (Q2150659) (← links)
- Jointly controlled lotteries with biased coins (Q2291182) (← links)
- Private communication in competing mechanism games (Q2324801) (← links)
- Sequential commitment games (Q2411532) (← links)
- A folk theorem for competing mechanisms (Q2447055) (← links)
- Partners or rivals? Strategies for the iterated prisoner's dilemma (Q2516229) (← links)
- COOPERATIVE GAMES WITH INCOMPLETE INFORMATION: SOME OPEN PROBLEMS (Q2854008) (← links)
- Private disclosure with multiple agents (Q6072249) (← links)
