Pages that link to "Item:Q980969"
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The following pages link to House allocation with existing tenants: a characterization (Q980969):
Displaying 29 items.
- House allocation when availability of houses may change unexpectedly (Q277304) (← links)
- Top trading with fixed tie-breaking in markets with indivisible goods (Q402062) (← links)
- Strategy-proofness and identical preferences lower bound in allocation problem of indivisible objects (Q722621) (← links)
- Influence in private-goods allocation (Q776963) (← links)
- Random mechanisms for house allocation with existing tenants (Q776969) (← links)
- Endogenous budget constraints in the assignment game (Q908178) (← links)
- Incompatibility between stability and consistency (Q1672771) (← links)
- Designing mechanisms to focalize welfare-improving strategies (Q1735813) (← links)
- Endowments-swapping-proof house allocation (Q1792571) (← links)
- On endowments and indivisibility: partial ownership in the Shapley-Scarf model (Q2205990) (← links)
- Swap-flexibility in the assignment of houses (Q2222205) (← links)
- Matching with restricted trade (Q2329419) (← links)
- Top trading cycles, consistency, and acyclic priorities for house allocation with existing tenants (Q2334138) (← links)
- Minimal consistent enlargements of the immediate acceptance rule and the top trading cycles rule in school choice (Q2362200) (← links)
- Efficient and incentive compatible exchange of real-time information (Q2424242) (← links)
- Reclaim-proof allocation of indivisible objects (Q2436293) (← links)
- A note on object allocation under lexicographic preferences (Q2441234) (← links)
- The ``Boston'' school-choice mechanism: an axiomatic approach (Q2447152) (← links)
- Consistent strategy-proof assignment by hierarchical exchange (Q2447169) (← links)
- Markovian assignment rules (Q2452135) (← links)
- Making just school assignments (Q2516227) (← links)
- Alternative characterizations of Boston mechanism (Q2637851) (← links)
- Strategyproof allocation mechanisms with endowments and M-convex distributional constraints (Q2680800) (← links)
- On reachable assignments in cycles (Q2695447) (← links)
- When does an additional stage improve welfare in centralized assignment? (Q6063102) (← links)
- Reallocation with priorities and minimal envy mechanisms (Q6074836) (← links)
- Optimal assignment mechanisms with imperfect verification (Q6076910) (← links)
- Housing markets since Shapley and Scarf (Q6121908) (← links)
- Outside options in neutral allocation of discrete resources (Q6156321) (← links)
