The following pages link to Brendan Lucier (Q1025307):
Displaying 39 items.
- Local overlaps in special unfoldings of convex polyhedra (Q1025308) (← links)
- Two-buyer sequential multiunit auctions with no overbidding (Q2109940) (← links)
- Contract design for afforestation programs (Q2152108) (← links)
- Combinatorial assortment optimization (Q2190396) (← links)
- Simultaneous auctions without complements are (almost) efficient (Q2206818) (← links)
- Bounding the inefficiency of outcomes in generalized second price auctions (Q2253843) (← links)
- Strategyproof mechanisms for competitive influence in networks (Q2362354) (← links)
- Average-case analysis of quicksort and binary insertion tree height using incompressibility (Q2379940) (← links)
- The price of stability of envy-free equilibria in multi-buyer sequential auctions (Q2670902) (← links)
- Dynamic weighted matching with heterogeneous arrival and departure rates (Q2692262) (← links)
- Bayesian algorithmic mechanism design (Q2875156) (← links)
- Limits of Efficiency in Sequential Auctions (Q2937755) (← links)
- Equilibrium in Combinatorial Public Projects (Q2937770) (← links)
- Clearing Markets via Bundles (Q2938655) (← links)
- On-Demand or Spot? Selling the Cloud to Risk-Averse Customers (Q2959820) (← links)
- Correlated and Coarse Equilibria of Single-Item Auctions (Q2959824) (← links)
- Reaching Consensus via non-Bayesian Asynchronous Learning in Social Networks (Q2969618) (← links)
- Prophet Inequalities Made Easy: Stochastic Optimization by Pricing Nonstochastic Inputs (Q3304731) (← links)
- Combinatorial Walrasian Equilibrium (Q3460334) (← links)
- The (Non)-Existence of Stable Mechanisms in Incomplete Information Environments (Q3460776) (← links)
- On the Limitations of Greedy Mechanism Design for Truthful Combinatorial Auctions (Q3587371) (← links)
- Exponential Segregation in a Two-Dimensional Schelling Model with Tolerant Individuals (Q4575802) (← links)
- Approximate Efficiency in Matching Markets (Q4614076) (← links)
- Beating 1-1/e for ordered prophets (Q4977961) (← links)
- From Duels to Battlefields: Computing Equilibria of Blotto and Other Games (Q5108243) (← links)
- A Simple and Approximately Optimal Mechanism for an Additive Buyer (Q5133980) (← links)
- The price of anarchy in large games (Q5361894) (← links)
- Combinatorial Auctions via Posted Prices (Q5363025) (← links)
- Maximizing Social Influence in Nearly Optimal Time (Q5384031) (← links)
- Influence Maximization in Undirected Networks (Q5384071) (← links)
- On the limits of black-box reductions in mechanism design (Q5415493) (← links)
- (Q5417647) (← links)
- Dueling algorithms (Q5419091) (← links)
- Combinatorial walrasian equilibrium (Q5495776) (← links)
- Simultaneous auctions are (almost) efficient (Q5495790) (← links)
- Equilibria of Greedy Combinatorial Auctions (Q5737806) (← links)
- An $O(\log \log m)$ Prophet Inequality for Subadditive Combinatorial Auctions (Q5864664) (← links)
- (Q5875708) (← links)
- Multi-Item Nontruthful Auctions Achieve Good Revenue (Q5885584) (← links)
