Pages that link to "Item:Q1113782"
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The following pages link to Multidimensional incentive compatibility and mechanism design (Q1113782):
Displayed 43 items.
- Optimal contract design in the joint economic lot size problem with multi-dimensional asymmetric information (Q323245) (← links)
- Complexity of solution structures in nonlinear pricing (Q363545) (← links)
- Material interests, moral reputation, and crowding out species protection on private land (Q456424) (← links)
- When is multidimensional screening a convex program? (Q533086) (← links)
- Convexity and multi-dimensional screening for spaces with different dimensions (Q694741) (← links)
- Haggling over substitutes (Q707294) (← links)
- On the optimality of pure bundling for a monopolist (Q745001) (← links)
- Truthful mechanism design for multidimensional scheduling via cycle monotonicity (Q834857) (← links)
- The robustness of multidimensional signalling equilibria (Q900030) (← links)
- Biased procurement auctions (Q1003106) (← links)
- Contracts with endogenous information (Q1007781) (← links)
- Ex ante incentive efficient trading mechanisms without the private valuation restriction (Q1181222) (← links)
- Dominant strategy implementation of Bayesian incentive compatible allocation rules (Q1190249) (← links)
- Optimal regulation with unknown demand and cost functions (Q1289259) (← links)
- Multidimensional mechanism design for auctions with externalities (Q1290839) (← links)
- Optimal selling mechanisms for multiproduct monopolists: Incentive compatibility in the presence of budget constraints (Q1300369) (← links)
- Mechanism design for general screening problems with moral hazard (Q1338081) (← links)
- An optimal auction for complements (Q1357402) (← links)
- The optimal mechanism for selling to a budget-constrained buyer (Q1581188) (← links)
- Price discrimination and majority voting (Q1607262) (← links)
- Selling two goods optimally (Q1641015) (← links)
- Approximate revenue maximization with multiple items (Q1676468) (← links)
- Conditions for incentive compatibility in models with multidimensional allocation functions and one-dimensional types (Q1929140) (← links)
- Truthful germs are contagious: a local-to-global characterization of truthfulness (Q2016243) (← links)
- Selling two identical objects (Q2123177) (← links)
- A necessary optimality condition in two-dimensional screening (Q2143914) (← links)
- The menu-size complexity of revenue approximation (Q2155903) (← links)
- Optimal multi-unit mechanisms with private demands (Q2173417) (← links)
- Existence of solutions to principal-agent problems with adverse selection under minimal assumptions (Q2178586) (← links)
- Pricing lotteries (Q2253836) (← links)
- Existence in multidimensional screening with general nonlinear preferences (Q2323599) (← links)
- Selling multiple correlated goods: revenue maximization and menu-size complexity (Q2324834) (← links)
- Bounding the optimal revenue of selling multiple goods (Q2345450) (← links)
- The power of randomness in Bayesian optimal mechanism design (Q2347783) (← links)
- Market and non-market mechanisms for the optimal allocation of scarce resources (Q2437840) (← links)
- Catalog competition and Nash equilibrium in nonlinear pricing games (Q2467517) (← links)
- Multidimensional mechanism design: revenue maximization and the multiple-good monopoly (Q2469842) (← links)
- Bundling as an optimal selling mechanism for a multiple-good monopolist (Q2491028) (← links)
- General truthfulness characterizations via convex analysis (Q2667284) (← links)
- Duality and Optimality of Auctions for Uniform Distributions (Q3133819) (← links)
- Efficient Computation of Optimal Auctions via Reduced Forms (Q5108230) (← links)
- On revenue maximization for selling multiple independently distributed items (Q5171012) (← links)
- Derandomization of persuasion mechanisms (Q6072236) (← links)