Pages that link to "Item:Q1176684"
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The following pages link to Comparative statics in matching markets (Q1176684):
Displayed 31 items.
- Enrollment manipulations in school choice (Q268634) (← links)
- Object allocation via deferred-acceptance: strategy-proofness and comparative statics (Q290170) (← links)
- Two-sided micro-matching with technical progress (Q431223) (← links)
- Implications of capacity reduction and entry in many-to-one stable matching (Q485428) (← links)
- Restabilizing matching markets at senior level (Q705941) (← links)
- Axiomatization of the core of assignment games (Q815216) (← links)
- Two-sided matching with interdependent values (Q848607) (← links)
- Matching markets under (in)complete information (Q894021) (← links)
- Core structure and comparative statics in a hybrid matching market (Q926792) (← links)
- Social games: matching and the play of finitely repeated games (Q993792) (← links)
- The law of supply in games, markets and matching models (Q1367714) (← links)
- Vacancy chains and equilibration in senior-level labor markets (Q1371137) (← links)
- Approximate cores of games and economies with clubs. (Q1399544) (← links)
- Stable schedule matching under revealed preference. (Q1414616) (← links)
- Lone wolves in infinite, discrete matching markets (Q1651278) (← links)
- A stable and Pareto efficient update of matching in school choice (Q1668260) (← links)
- Comparative statics in the multiple-partners assignment game (Q1735807) (← links)
- Social integration in two-sided matching markets (Q1800976) (← links)
- The core and the hedonic core: Equivalence and comparative statics (Q1817337) (← links)
- Manipulability in matching markets: conflict and coincidence of interests (Q1926598) (← links)
- Unilateral substitutability is necessary for doctor-optimal stability (Q1984462) (← links)
- Some further properties of the cumulative offer process (Q2013375) (← links)
- Efficiency, stability, and commitment in senior level job matching markets (Q2025051) (← links)
- Slot-specific priorities with capacity transfers (Q2049501) (← links)
- Gainers and losers from market integration (Q2127893) (← links)
- Too good to fire: non-assortative matching to play a dynamic game (Q2212776) (← links)
- Consistency of the doctor-optimal equilibrium price vector in job-matching markets (Q2231426) (← links)
- Optimizing reserves in school choice: a dynamic programming approach (Q2294355) (← links)
- Incentives in landing slot problems (Q2359379) (← links)
- Consistency and population sensitivity properties in marriage and roommate markets (Q2453399) (← links)
- Two-Sided Matching Models (Q5150290) (← links)