Pages that link to "Item:Q1577929"
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The following pages link to The English auction with differentiated commodities (Q1577929):
Displayed 50 items.
- Testing substitutability (Q423737) (← links)
- On minimal ascending auctions with payment discounts (Q423778) (← links)
- Properties of the DGS-auction algorithm (Q431903) (← links)
- Incentive compatible market design with applications (Q495753) (← links)
- An efficient multi-item dynamic auction with budget constrained bidders (Q495767) (← links)
- Stability and competitive equilibria in multi-unit trading networks with discrete concave utility functions (Q495853) (← links)
- Adjusting prices in the multiple-partners assignment game (Q532699) (← links)
- A model of partnership formation (Q553531) (← links)
- Efficiency and strategy-proofness in object assignment problems with multi-demand preferences (Q682485) (← links)
- Simultaneous independent online auctions with discrete bid increments (Q816718) (← links)
- Characterization of the Walrasian equilibria of the assignment model (Q845010) (← links)
- On ascending Vickrey auctions for heterogeneous objects (Q869853) (← links)
- Ascending price Vickrey auctions for general valuations (Q869869) (← links)
- Counting combinatorial choice rules (Q876881) (← links)
- Paths to stability in the assignment problem (Q908181) (← links)
- Inapproximability results for combinatorial auctions with submodular utility functions (Q943868) (← links)
- Informational limitations of ascending combinatorial auctions (Q972880) (← links)
- Substitute goods, auctions, and equilibrium (Q1001822) (← links)
- Multi-item Vickrey-Dutch auctions (Q1021601) (← links)
- Coalitional strategy-proofness and fairness (Q1028549) (← links)
- On competitive equilibria with common complementarities. (Q1402485) (← links)
- Walrasian equilibrium in an exchange economy with indivisibilities. (Q1414823) (← links)
- An efficient ascending auction for private valuations (Q1622372) (← links)
- Independence systems in gross-substitute valuations (Q1627008) (← links)
- Strategy-proofness of worker-optimal matching with continuously transferable utility (Q1651280) (← links)
- Gross substitutability: an algorithmic survey (Q1682734) (← links)
- On the manipulability of competitive equilibrium rules in many-to-many buyer-seller markets (Q1684134) (← links)
- Sequential rules for house allocation with price restrictions (Q1691348) (← links)
- Demand-flow of agents with gross-substitute valuations (Q1709953) (← links)
- Time bounds for iterative auctions: a unified approach by discrete convex analysis (Q1751147) (← links)
- Exact bounds for steepest descent algorithms of $L$-convex function minimization (Q1785253) (← links)
- Bundling equilibrium in combinatorial auctions (Q1885427) (← links)
- Non-manipulability of uniform price auctions with a large number of objects (Q2002068) (← links)
- Walrasian's characterization and a universal ascending auction (Q2013362) (← links)
- Position auctions with multi-unit demands (Q2031180) (← links)
- Connected price dynamics with revealed preferences and Auctioneer's discretion in VCG combinatorial auction (Q2098923) (← links)
- A speedy auction using approximated bidders' preferences (Q2173118) (← links)
- Lone wolves in competitive equilibria (Q2217357) (← links)
- Consistency of the doctor-optimal equilibrium price vector in job-matching markets (Q2231426) (← links)
- Online ascending auctions for gradually expiring items (Q2253832) (← links)
- Side-communication yields efficiency of ascending auctions: The two-items case (Q2276546) (← links)
- Geometry of gross substitutes valuations (Q2283101) (← links)
- The discrete separation theorem and price adjustment directions in markets with heterogeneous commodities (Q2297662) (← links)
- Connecting the cooperative and competitive structures of the multiple-partners assignment game (Q2373771) (← links)
- Mechanisms for a spatially distributed market (Q2389294) (← links)
- Note on time bounds of two-phase algorithms for \(L\)-convex function minimization (Q2400167) (← links)
- Defensive sniping and efficiency in simultaneous hard-close proxy auctions (Q2427875) (← links)
- Multi-item Vickrey-English-Dutch auctions (Q2436300) (← links)
- Sets in excess demand in simple ascending auctions with unit-demand bidders (Q2449341) (← links)
- Combinatorial auctions (Q2480257) (← links)