Pages that link to "Item:Q1757595"

The following pages link to Designing matching mechanisms under constraints: an approach from discrete convex analysis (Q1757595):

Displaying 15 items.

• Dynamic reserves in matching markets (Q785541) (← links)
• Impossibility of weakly stable and strategy-proof mechanism (Q2159837) (← links)
• Consistency of the doctor-optimal equilibrium price vector in job-matching markets (Q2231426) (← links)
• Computing Walrasian equilibria: fast algorithms and structural properties (Q2288196) (← links)
• The discrete separation theorem and price adjustment directions in markets with heterogeneous commodities (Q2297662) (← links)
• The vigilant eating rule: a general approach for probabilistic economic design with constraints (Q2675446) (← links)
• Strategyproof allocation mechanisms with endowments and M-convex distributional constraints (Q2680800) (← links)
• The Finite Matroid-Based Valuation Conjecture is False (Q4959128) (← links)
• A Matroid Generalization of the Super-Stable Matching Problem (Q5084102) (← links)
• Stable Matching with Proportionality Constraints (Q5129207) (← links)
• Market Design (Q5150291) (← links)
• Reallocation with priorities and minimal envy mechanisms (Q6074836) (← links)
• Strategyproof mechanism for two-sided matching with resource allocation (Q6098859) (← links)
• Equivalence between substitutability and \(\mathrm{M}^\natural\)-concavity for set functions under discrete transfers (Q6161978) (← links)
• A planner-optimal matching mechanism and its incentive compatibility in a restricted domain (Q6176744) (← links)