The following pages link to Sjaak Hurkens (Q228608):
Displaying 15 items.
- Dynamic matching and bargaining with heterogeneous deadlines (Q495756) (← links)
- On the optimality of pure bundling for a monopolist (Q745001) (← links)
- Endogenous Stackelberg leadership (Q1300676) (← links)
- Games with imperfectly observable commitment (Q1378028) (← links)
- Evolutionary insights on the willingness to communicate (Q1417443) (← links)
- Commitment robust equilibria and endogenous timing (Q1815584) (← links)
- On forward induction and evolutionary and strategic stability (Q1851229) (← links)
- Endogenous price leadership (Q1885440) (← links)
- Learning by forgetful players (Q1906716) (← links)
- Multi-sided pre-play communication by burning money (Q1920933) (← links)
- Free entry does not imply zero profits (Q1927398) (← links)
- Would I lie to you? On social preferences and lying aversion (Q2271098) (← links)
- Fraud tolerance in optimal crowdfunding (Q2311131) (← links)
- Optimal crowdfunding design (Q2334128) (← links)
- Bayesian Nash equilibrium in “linear” Cournot models with private information about costs (Q4584722) (← links)
