The following pages link to Sharing a polluted river (Q2384436):
Displaying 42 items.
- Cost allocation in asymmetric trees (Q296616) (← links)
- Comparable characterizations of four solutions for permission tree games (Q523060) (← links)
- Loss allocation in energy transmission networks (Q523466) (← links)
- Sharing the proceeds from a hierarchical venture (Q523467) (← links)
- Games with a permission structure -- a survey on generalizations and applications (Q526627) (← links)
- Rejoinder on: ``Games with a permission structure -- a survey on generalizations and applications'' (Q526630) (← links)
- Networks of common property resources (Q535168) (← links)
- A polynomial time algorithm for computing the nucleolus for a class of disjunctive games with a permission structure (Q637584) (← links)
- Sharing a river among satiable agents (Q952762) (← links)
- An algorithm for computing the nucleolus of disjunctive non-negative additive games with an acyclic permission structure (Q992684) (← links)
- Sharing sequential values in a network (Q1622386) (← links)
- Polluted river problems and games with a permission structure (Q1651269) (← links)
- Coincidence of the Shapley value with other solutions satisfying covariance (Q1680729) (← links)
- From hierarchies to levels: new solutions for games with hierarchical structure (Q1684130) (← links)
- Responsibility and sharing the cost of cleaning a polluted river (Q1731598) (← links)
- Network pollution games (Q1755784) (← links)
- Games with a local permission structure: separation of authority and value generation (Q2015041) (← links)
- Allocating the costs of cleaning a river: expected responsibility versus median responsibility (Q2021794) (← links)
- A bargaining model for sharing water in a river with negative externality (Q2085477) (← links)
- Clique games: a family of games with coincidence between the nucleolus and the Shapley value (Q2173166) (← links)
- A solution for the flood cost sharing problem (Q2179773) (← links)
- Sharing a river with downstream externalities (Q2184005) (← links)
- A unified cooperative model for environmental costs in supply chains: the Shapley value for the linear case (Q2196000) (← links)
- Sharing the costs of cleanup polluted river: upstream compensation method (Q2208911) (← links)
- On how to allocate the fixed cost of transport systems (Q2241244) (← links)
- The average tree permission value for games with a permission tree (Q2256861) (← links)
- Sharing the costs of cleaning a river: the upstream responsibility rule (Q2343390) (← links)
- On proper Shapley values for monotone TU-games (Q2349419) (← links)
- On hierarchies and communication (Q2450142) (← links)
- Reconciling marginalism with egalitarianism: consistency, monotonicity, and implementation of egalitarian Shapley values (Q2452118) (← links)
- Constrained core solutions for totally positive games with ordered players (Q2453492) (← links)
- Allocation rules for multi-choice games with a permission tree structure (Q2678597) (← links)
- Axiomatic analysis of liability problems with rooted-tree networks in tort law (Q2683485) (← links)
- New Results for Network Pollution Games (Q2817847) (← links)
- THE RIVER SHARING PROBLEM: A SURVEY (Q2852566) (← links)
- CLEANING A RIVER: AN ANALYSIS OF VOLUNTARY JOINT ACTION (Q3060269) (← links)
- Revenue Sharing in Airline Alliance Networks (Q5013375) (← links)
- Networks, Communication and Hierarchy: Applications to Cooperative Games (Q5057948) (← links)
- Design of water quality policies based on proportionality in multi-issue problems with crossed claims (Q6096606) (← links)
- A game-theoretic multi-stakeholder model for cost allocation in urban consolidation centres (Q6115615) (← links)
- Two new classes of methods to share the cost of cleaning up a polluted river (Q6116313) (← links)
- Cost allocation in energy distribution networks (Q6146450) (← links)
