Pages that link to "Item:Q2452230"
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The following pages link to A modified deferred acceptance algorithm for many-to-one matching markets with externalities among firms (Q2452230):
Displaying 9 items.
- Competitive equilibria in Shapley-Scarf markets with couples (Q776971) (← links)
- Labor market matching with ensuing competitive externalities in large economies (Q2019341) (← links)
- The roommate problem with externalities (Q2021792) (← links)
- Core and top trading cycles in a market with indivisible goods and externalities (Q2138371) (← links)
- Existence of stable allocations in matching markets with infinite contracts: a topological approach (Q2222218) (← links)
- Downstream competition and upstream labor market matching (Q2280043) (← links)
- Strategic Issues in One-to-One Matching with Externalities (Q5013394) (← links)
- Assortative matching with externalities and farsighted agents (Q6176200) (← links)
- Coalitional stability in matching problems with externalities and random preferences (Q6188684) (← links)