Pages that link to "Item:Q2482673"
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The following pages link to A stable matching model with an entrance criterion applied to the assignment of students to dormitories at the Technion (Q2482673):
Displayed 13 items.
- Stability and strategy-proofness for college admissions with an eligibility criterion (Q490945) (← links)
- Incentive compatibility for the stable matching model with an entrance criterion (Q532764) (← links)
- The stable marriage problem with master preference lists (Q1005239) (← links)
- Handling preferences in student-project allocation (Q1730741) (← links)
- College admissions with entrance exams: centralized versus decentralized (Q1757600) (← links)
- Complexity of finding Pareto-efficient allocations of highest welfare (Q2030716) (← links)
- A collection of constraint programming models for the three-dimensional stable matching problem with cyclic preferences (Q2079273) (← links)
- Stable matching of student-groups to dormitories (Q2140313) (← links)
- Pareto optimality in many-to-many matching problems (Q2339842) (← links)
- New and simple algorithms for stable flow problems (Q5915793) (← links)
- Computing relaxations for the three-dimensional stable matching problem with cyclic preferences (Q6073306) (← links)
- Recognizing when a preference system is close to admitting a master list (Q6091175) (← links)
- Recognizing when a preference system is close to admitting a master list (Q6124592) (← links)