Pages that link to "Item:Q2482680"
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The following pages link to The stability of the equilibrium outcomes in the admission games induced by stable matching rules (Q2482680):
Displayed 13 items.
- An analysis of the German university admissions system (Q361830) (← links)
- On the existence of a strictly strong Nash equilibrium under the student-optimal deferred acceptance algorithm (Q485776) (← links)
- A further note on the college admission game (Q662278) (← links)
- On Marilda Sotomayor's extraordinary contribution to matching theory (Q908176) (← links)
- Stability and the immediate acceptance rule when school priorities are weak (Q1684126) (← links)
- Subgame perfect equilibria under the deferred acceptance algorithm (Q2041080) (← links)
- Nash implementation on the basis of general priorities (Q2078086) (← links)
- Deferred acceptance algorithm with retrade (Q2108764) (← links)
- The outcome of competitive equilibrium rules in buyer-seller markets when the agents play strategically (Q2363424) (← links)
- Equilibria under deferred acceptance: dropping strategies, filled positions, and welfare (Q2437848) (← links)
- Games with capacity manipulation: incentives and Nash equilibria (Q2453419) (← links)
- Two-Sided Matching Models (Q5150290) (← links)
- When does an additional stage improve welfare in centralized assignment? (Q6063102) (← links)