Pages that link to "Item:Q290170"
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The following pages link to Object allocation via deferred-acceptance: strategy-proofness and comparative statics (Q290170):
Displayed 17 items.
- A necessary and sufficient condition for weak Maskin monotonicity in an allocation problem with indivisible goods (Q682480) (← links)
- Decentralized college admissions under single application (Q826044) (← links)
- Constrained stability in two-sided matching markets (Q826612) (← links)
- Object allocation via immediate-acceptance: characterizations and an affirmative action application (Q1633670) (← links)
- Some further properties of the cumulative offer process (Q2013375) (← links)
- How lotteries in school choice help to level the playing field (Q2049478) (← links)
- Serial dictatorship mechanisms with reservation prices: heterogeneous objects (Q2058845) (← links)
- Serial dictatorship mechanisms with reservation prices (Q2206002) (← links)
- Evolution and Rawlsian social choice in matching (Q2206800) (← links)
- Top trading cycles, consistency, and acyclic priorities for house allocation with existing tenants (Q2334138) (← links)
- Strategy-proof allocation with outside option (Q2681500) (← links)
- School choice with preference rank classes (Q2681516) (← links)
- On Capacity-Filling and Substitutable Choice Rules (Q4958546) (← links)
- Strategy-Proofness Makes the Difference: Deferred-Acceptance with Responsive Priorities (Q5247606) (← links)
- Two school systems, one district: what to do when a unified admissions process is impossible (Q5964686) (← links)
- Singles monotonicity and stability in one-to-one matching problems (Q6188681) (← links)
- Reallocation with priorities (Q6188682) (← links)