Pages that link to "Item:Q3057835"
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The following pages link to Asymptotic Equivalence of Probabilistic Serial and Random Priority Mechanisms (Q3057835):
Displayed 47 items.
- Assignment problems with complementarities (Q308621) (← links)
- An equilibrium analysis of the probabilistic serial mechanism (Q328558) (← links)
- Improving schools through school choice: a market design approach (Q337801) (← links)
- Strategy-proof stochastic assignment (Q402069) (← links)
- The Pareto-dominant strategy-proof and fair rule for problems with indivisible goods (Q431227) (← links)
- Assigning agents to a line (Q485809) (← links)
- When is the probabilistic serial assignment uniquely efficient and envy-free? (Q504391) (← links)
- Stability concepts in matching under distributional constraints (Q508390) (← links)
- On the operation of multiple matching markets (Q516981) (← links)
- Efficiency under a combination of ordinal and cardinal information on preferences (Q553528) (← links)
- Incentives in the probabilistic serial mechanism (Q848608) (← links)
- Welfare-maximizing assignment of agents to hierarchical positions (Q898694) (← links)
- Finding all stable matchings with couples (Q908185) (← links)
- Random assignment of multiple indivisible objects (Q1005770) (← links)
- The generalized random priority mechanism with budgets (Q1622384) (← links)
- Probabilistic assignment: an extension approach (Q1649093) (← links)
- On the tradeoff between efficiency and strategyproofness (Q1651219) (← links)
- The impossibility of extending random dictatorship to weak preferences (Q1668159) (← links)
- Equivalence of efficiency notions for ordinal assignment problems (Q1668490) (← links)
- Probabilistic assignment of indivisible objects when agents have the same preferences except the ordinal ranking of one object (Q1680102) (← links)
- Impossibilities for probabilistic assignment (Q1697833) (← links)
- Non-manipulability of uniform price auctions with a large number of objects (Q2002068) (← links)
- Tight social welfare approximation of probabilistic serial (Q2089061) (← links)
- A pessimist's approach to one-sided matching (Q2103007) (← links)
- Trading probabilities along cycles (Q2138374) (← links)
- Constrained random matching (Q2155237) (← links)
- On endowments and indivisibility: partial ownership in the Shapley-Scarf model (Q2205990) (← links)
- Size versus fairness in the assignment problem (Q2343388) (← links)
- Fairness and efficiency in strategy-proof object allocation mechanisms (Q2359384) (← links)
- Efficient lottery design (Q2362194) (← links)
- Guaranteed size ratio of ordinally efficient and envy-free mechanisms in the assignment problem (Q2411514) (← links)
- Assigning more students to their top choices: a comparison of tie-breaking rules (Q2416641) (← links)
- Efficient resource allocation under multi-unit demand (Q2437801) (← links)
- The ``Boston'' school-choice mechanism: an axiomatic approach (Q2447152) (← links)
- Probabilistic assignment of indivisible goods with single-peaked preferences (Q2453443) (← links)
- Making just school assignments (Q2516227) (← links)
- Strategic experimentation with random serial dictatorship (Q2673211) (← links)
- Stability in Large Matching Markets with Complementarities (Q2931695) (← links)
- Stable Matching in Large Economies (Q5225243) (← links)
- Incentive properties for ordinal mechanisms (Q5964696) (← links)
- On rank dominance of tie‐breaking rules (Q6076906) (← links)
- Strategy-proof and envy-free mechanisms for house allocation (Q6090447) (← links)
- Inefficiency of random serial dictatorship under incomplete information (Q6090465) (← links)
- Bounded incentives in manipulating the probabilistic serial rule (Q6142601) (← links)
- Outside options in neutral allocation of discrete resources (Q6156321) (← links)
- Ordinal Bayesian incentive compatibility in random assignment model (Q6156325) (← links)
- Strategy-proof and envy-free random assignment (Q6163283) (← links)