Pages that link to "Item:Q3320086"
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The following pages link to Optimal Incentive Schemes with Many Agents (Q3320086):
Displayed 43 items.
- An envelope approach to tournament design (Q268598) (← links)
- All-or-nothing payments (Q443750) (← links)
- Correlation and relative performance evaluation (Q665451) (← links)
- Common shocks and relative compensation (Q665735) (← links)
- Computing optimal contracts in combinatorial agencies (Q714788) (← links)
- Tournaments as a response to ambiguity aversion in incentive contracts (Q900449) (← links)
- Normative properties of stock market equilibrium with moral hazard (Q924937) (← links)
- Information in tournaments under limited liability (Q999734) (← links)
- Participation incentives in rank order tournaments with endogenous entry (Q1018021) (← links)
- Inefficiency and complementarity in sharing games (Q1022382) (← links)
- Timing of information in agency problems with hidden actions (Q1045983) (← links)
- Ignorance in a multi-agent setting (Q1046299) (← links)
- Stopping agents from ``cheating'' (Q1117129) (← links)
- A note on modelling tournaments (Q1198214) (← links)
- Quality of group decisions (Q1271078) (← links)
- Decentralization and collusion (Q1277089) (← links)
- Implementing action profiles when agents collude (Q1357585) (← links)
- Incentive contracts in two-sided moral hazards with multiple agents (Q1367910) (← links)
- Implementing coordinated team play (Q1367913) (← links)
- Production externalities and two-way distortion in principal-multi-agent problems (Q1577932) (← links)
- Implementation in principal-agent models of adverse selection (Q1584555) (← links)
- Collective organizations versus relative performance contracts: Inequality, risk sharing, and moral hazard (Q1601448) (← links)
- Competitive prizes: when less scrutiny induces more effort (Q1602939) (← links)
- Team incentives under moral and altruistic preferences: which team to choose? (Q1656968) (← links)
- Moral hazard and tradeable pollution emission permits (Q1674999) (← links)
- Reciprocity in the principal-multiple agent model (Q1675000) (← links)
- Collusion and discrimination in organizations (Q1876651) (← links)
- Team incentives with imperfect mutual inference (Q2002074) (← links)
- The effect of ambiguity aversion on reward scheme choice (Q2343329) (← links)
- The optimality of team contracts (Q2351252) (← links)
- Dynamic risk-sharing with two-sided moral hazard (Q2455678) (← links)
- Collusion and the organization of delegated expertise (Q2469846) (← links)
- The principal-agent problem with adaptive players (Q2563563) (← links)
- Recommended play and correlated equilibria: an experimental study (Q2642882) (← links)
- Incentives under equal-pay constraint and subjective peer evaluation (Q2675431) (← links)
- OPTIMAL MULTI-AGENT PERFORMANCE MEASURES FOR TEAM CONTRACTS (Q3005848) (← links)
- Tournaments with Prize-setting Agents* (Q3173497) (← links)
- Unraveling in a repeated moral hazard model with multiple agents (Q4586079) (← links)
- Contracting Theory with Competitive Interacting Agents (Q4631456) (← links)
- Principal-Agent Models (Q5149738) (← links)
- A Tale of a Principal and Many, Many Agents (Q5219725) (← links)
- WAGE FLOORS, IMPERFECT PERFORMANCE MEASURES, AND OPTIMAL JOB DESIGN (Q5420151) (← links)
- Mean–field moral hazard for optimal energy demand response management (Q6054139) (← links)