Pages that link to "Item:Q3418482"
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The following pages link to Weak Monotonicity Characterizes Deterministic Dominant-Strategy Implementation (Q3418482):
Displayed 50 items.
- Characterizing the resolute part of monotonic social choice correspondences (Q345198) (← links)
- Truthful optimization using mechanisms with verification (Q391782) (← links)
- Multidimensional mechanism design in single peaked type spaces (Q406380) (← links)
- Roberts' theorem with neutrality: a social welfare ordering approach (Q417702) (← links)
- Incentive compatible market design with applications (Q495753) (← links)
- Revenue monotonicity in deterministic, dominant-strategy combinatorial auctions (Q543608) (← links)
- Improved lower bounds for non-utilitarian truthfulness (Q627119) (← links)
- Implementation via mechanisms with transfers (Q631122) (← links)
- Truthful mechanisms for selfish routing and two-parameter agents (Q647482) (← links)
- Two simplified proofs for Roberts' theorem (Q733788) (← links)
- Multi-unit auctions with budget limits (Q765207) (← links)
- Truthful mechanism design for multidimensional scheduling via cycle monotonicity (Q834857) (← links)
- The communication cost of selfishness (Q840676) (← links)
- Implementability under monotonic transformations in differences (Q893399) (← links)
- Ex-post implementation and preference aggregation via potentials (Q957859) (← links)
- Efficient allocation of heterogeneous commodities with balanced transfers (Q976966) (← links)
- Truthful mechanisms for two-range-values variant of unrelated scheduling (Q1019737) (← links)
- Setting lower bounds on truthfulness (Q1651232) (← links)
- Black-box reductions for cost-sharing mechanism design (Q1735730) (← links)
- Incentive compatible mechanisms for scheduling two-parameter job agents on parallel identical machines to minimize the weighted number of late jobs (Q1744245) (← links)
- No truthful mechanism can be better than \(n\) approximate for two natural problems (Q1792559) (← links)
- Conditions for incentive compatibility in models with multidimensional allocation functions and one-dimensional types (Q1929140) (← links)
- Truthful germs are contagious: a local-to-global characterization of truthfulness (Q2016243) (← links)
- Maxmin implementation (Q2025040) (← links)
- Dominant strategy implementability and zero length cycles (Q2074053) (← links)
- Efficient combinatorial allocations: individual rationality versus stability (Q2098976) (← links)
- Selling mechanisms for a financially constrained buyer (Q2212767) (← links)
- Multi-unit auctions: beyond Roberts (Q2253831) (← links)
- On the uniqueness of Groves mechanisms and the payoff equivalence principle (Q2268126) (← links)
- Balanced implementability of sequencing rules (Q2278931) (← links)
- Implementability with contingent contracts (Q2300371) (← links)
- On the equivalence of Bayesian and dominant strategy implementation for environments with nonlinear utilities (Q2323605) (← links)
- Random assignments on preference domains with a tier structure (Q2338670) (← links)
- Incentive compatible mulit-unit combinatorial auctions: a primal dual approach (Q2345944) (← links)
- Mechanism design with two alternatives in quasi-linear environments (Q2353701) (← links)
- Monotonicity and revenue equivalence domains by monotonic transformations in differences (Q2358563) (← links)
- Characterizing implementable allocation rules in multi-dimensional environments (Q2397662) (← links)
- Incentive compatibility in non-quasilinear environments (Q2446468) (← links)
- Truthful implementation and preference aggregation in restricted domains (Q2447058) (← links)
- Dominant strategy implementation with a convex product space of valuations (Q2450090) (← links)
- Weak monotonicity and Bayes-Nash incentive compatibility (Q2462292) (← links)
- General truthfulness characterizations via convex analysis (Q2667284) (← links)
- Characterization of Truthful Mechanisms for One-Dimensional Single Facility Location Game with Payments (Q2937768) (← links)
- Private Capacities in Mechanism Design (Q3182917) (← links)
- Obviously Strategyproof Mechanisms for Machine Scheduling. (Q5075789) (← links)
- Mechanism Design (Q5149740) (← links)
- A Characterization of Combinatorial Demand (Q5219292) (← links)
- Improved Lower Bounds for Non-utilitarian Truthfulness (Q5443369) (← links)
- (Q5743446) (← links)
- The polyhedral geometry of truthful auctions (Q6086004) (← links)