Pages that link to "Item:Q372362"
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The following pages link to An alternative characterization of top trading cycles (Q372362):
Displaying 18 items.
- Two simple variations of top trading cycles (Q496872) (← links)
- New axioms for immediate acceptance (Q682464) (← links)
- Competitive equilibria in school assignment (Q1651277) (← links)
- Endowments-swapping-proof house allocation (Q1792571) (← links)
- Trading probabilities along cycles (Q2138374) (← links)
- On endowments and indivisibility: partial ownership in the Shapley-Scarf model (Q2205990) (← links)
- Matching with restricted trade (Q2329419) (← links)
- The modified Boston mechanism (Q2334829) (← links)
- New axioms for deferred acceptance (Q2397664) (← links)
- When preference misreporting is harm[less]ful? (Q2402812) (← links)
- Strategy-proof school choice mechanisms with minimum quotas and initial endowments (Q2409677) (← links)
- A general equivalence theorem for allocation of indivisible objects (Q2444698) (← links)
- Making just school assignments (Q2516227) (← links)
- Alternative characterizations of Boston mechanism (Q2637851) (← links)
- Strategyproof allocation mechanisms with endowments and M-convex distributional constraints (Q2680800) (← links)
- School choice with preference rank classes (Q2681516) (← links)
- New axioms for top trading cycles (Q6066263) (← links)
- Housing markets since Shapley and Scarf (Q6121908) (← links)
