The following pages link to Self-Enforcing Wage Contracts (Q3795450):
Displayed 28 items.
- Dynamic beliefs (Q485743) (← links)
- Optimal risk sharing and borrowing constraints in a continuous-time model with limited commitment (Q654513) (← links)
- Income fluctuation and asymmetric information: An example of a repeated principal-agent problem (Q751456) (← links)
- Public information in Markov games (Q894007) (← links)
- Introduction to symposium on dynamic contracts and mechanism design (Q900598) (← links)
- A duality approach to continuous-time contracting problems with limited commitment (Q900606) (← links)
- Stock grants as a commitment device (Q959669) (← links)
- Ex ante payments in self-enforcing risk-sharing contracts (Q1371191) (← links)
- Markov-perfect risk sharing, moral hazard and limited commitment (Q1624474) (← links)
- Stochastic stability of monotone economies in regenerative environments (Q1693197) (← links)
- Optimal self-enforcement and termination (Q1734582) (← links)
- Dynamic relational contracts under complete information (Q1753710) (← links)
- Does risk sharing increase with risk aversion and risk when commitment is limited? (Q1994632) (← links)
- Wage bargaining as an optimal control problem: a dynamic version of the efficient bargaining model (Q2044827) (← links)
- Optimal finite horizon contract with limited commitment (Q2120602) (← links)
- Optimal long-term contracts with disability insurance under limited commitment (Q2138619) (← links)
- Optimal CEO turnover (Q2155243) (← links)
- Risk sharing contracts with private information and one-sided commitment (Q2323289) (← links)
- Optimal dynamic risk sharing when enforcement is a decision variable (Q2373766) (← links)
- Even up: maintaining relationships (Q2397634) (← links)
- Relational contracts, limited liability, and employment dynamics (Q2397637) (← links)
- When can we do better than autarky? (Q2439807) (← links)
- Dynamic risk-sharing with two-sided moral hazard (Q2455678) (← links)
- Competitive equilibria of economies with a continuum of consumers and aggregate shocks (Q2496236) (← links)
- THE FIRM AS A NEXUS OF STRATEGIES (Q4675821) (← links)
- Dynamic signaling with stochastic stakes (Q6059522) (← links)
- The dynamics of working hours and wages under implicit contracts (Q6076774) (← links)
- A protocol for repeated bargaining (Q6093649) (← links)