Pages that link to "Item:Q4006271"
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The following pages link to Correlated Information and Mecanism Design (Q4006271):
Displayed 50 items.
- Goodwill can hurt: a theoretical and experimental investigation of return policies in auctions (Q324169) (← links)
- Information concentration in common value environments (Q370959) (← links)
- Prizes and patents: using market signals to provide incentives for innovations (Q413512) (← links)
- Public goods, participation constraints, and democracy: a possibility theorem (Q417681) (← links)
- Exploring the scope of neurometrically informed mechanism design (Q523002) (← links)
- On sufficiency of dominant strategy implementation in environments with correlated types (Q529764) (← links)
- Informational smallness and the scope for limiting information rents (Q617679) (← links)
- Information acquisition and full surplus extraction (Q617680) (← links)
- On the informed seller problem: optimal information disclosure (Q633787) (← links)
- On efficient partnership dissolution under ex post individual rationality (Q639892) (← links)
- Auction design with endogenously correlated buyer types (Q665452) (← links)
- Bilateral trading with contingent contracts (Q776849) (← links)
- Optimal contracts with contingent allocation (Q777726) (← links)
- Mechanism design goes to war: Peaceful outcomes with interdependent and correlated types (Q839608) (← links)
- A dynamic mechanism and surplus extraction under ambiguity (Q840688) (← links)
- Mechanism design with interdependent valuations: surplus extraction (Q878397) (← links)
- Individually rational, budget-balanced mechanisms and allocation of surplus (Q928879) (← links)
- An efficient solution to the informed principal problem (Q938057) (← links)
- Optimal use of correlated information in mechanism design when full surplus extraction may be impossible (Q996382) (← links)
- Equilibrium in the two-player, \(k\)-double auction with affiliated private values (Q996390) (← links)
- Optimal voting schemes with costly information acquisition (Q1001814) (← links)
- Ex ante incentive efficient trading mechanisms without the private valuation restriction (Q1181222) (← links)
- A dominant strategy double auction (Q1190252) (← links)
- Pollution claim settlements under correlated information (Q1268595) (← links)
- The English auction is optimal among simple sequential auctions (Q1270757) (← links)
- Optimal allocation and backup of computer resources under asymmetric information and incentive incompatibility (Q1278231) (← links)
- Existence of optimal auctions in general environments (Q1300508) (← links)
- Efficient budget balancing cartel equilibria with imperfect monitoring (Q1338090) (← links)
- The effectiveness of English auctions. (Q1399514) (← links)
- Informational size and incentive compatibility with aggregate uncertainty. (Q1416504) (← links)
- Partnerships, lemons, and efficient trade. (Q1421886) (← links)
- Optimal prize allocation in contests: the role of negative prizes (Q1753695) (← links)
- Efficient implementation with interdependent valuations and maxmin agents (Q1757591) (← links)
- Asymptotic revenue equivalence in auctions (Q1851233) (← links)
- The relevance of private information in mechanism design (Q1877157) (← links)
- The relationship between the allocation of goods and a seller's revenue (Q1877826) (← links)
- Bundling equilibrium in combinatorial auctions (Q1885427) (← links)
- Optimality versus practicality in market design: a comparison of two double auctions (Q2016235) (← links)
- Full surplus extraction from samples (Q2025025) (← links)
- Uncertainty and robustness of surplus extraction (Q2067386) (← links)
- Information disclosure and full surplus extraction in mechanism design (Q2173101) (← links)
- A note on optimal contracting with public \textit{ex post} information under limited liability (Q2178639) (← links)
- Core-selecting auctions with incomplete information (Q2178647) (← links)
- Vertical contracting with endogenous market structure (Q2231375) (← links)
- Implementability with contingent contracts (Q2300371) (← links)
- Mechanism design with ambiguous transfers: an analysis in finite dimensional naive type spaces (Q2324797) (← links)
- Approximation in mechanism design with interdependent values (Q2357821) (← links)
- The generic possibility of full surplus extraction in models with large type spaces (Q2359394) (← links)
- Mechanism design with side payments: individual rationality and iterative dominance (Q2370489) (← links)
- Ex-post full surplus extraction, straightforwardly (Q2373375) (← links)