Pages that link to "Item:Q4021529"
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The following pages link to Implementation in Undominated Strategies: A Look at Bounded Mechanisms (Q4021529):
Displayed 50 items.
- Bounded depths of rationality and implementation with complete information (Q308649) (← links)
- Subgame perfect implementation of the deserving winner of a competition with natural mechanisms (Q325031) (← links)
- A full characterization of Nash implementation with strategy space reduction (Q372374) (← links)
- Picking the winners (Q378331) (← links)
- A natural mechanism for eliciting rankings when jurors have favorites (Q485804) (← links)
- A natural mechanism to choose the deserving winner when the jury is made up of all contestants (Q531410) (← links)
- Multiplicity of mixed equilibria in mechanisms: a unified approach to exact and approximate implementation (Q617583) (← links)
- A characterization of equilibria in the Groves-Ledyard mechanism (Q617627) (← links)
- Implementation via mechanisms with transfers (Q631122) (← links)
- Robust implementation in general mechanisms (Q632946) (← links)
- Implementation in minimax regret equilibrium (Q632976) (← links)
- Nash implementation with partially honest individuals (Q665086) (← links)
- The scholarship assignment problem (Q700089) (← links)
- Leveraging possibilistic beliefs in unrestricted combinatorial auctions (Q725051) (← links)
- Strategic manipulations of multi-valued solutions in economies with indivisibilities (Q868214) (← links)
- Robust dynamic implementation (Q893413) (← links)
- Complexity and repeated implementation (Q896948) (← links)
- Strategic and structural uncertainty in robust implementation (Q900423) (← links)
- Dominant strategy implementation in economic environments (Q926788) (← links)
- Eliciting socially optimal rankings from unfair jurors (Q1017791) (← links)
- The optimal design of a market (Q1125565) (← links)
- Feasible Bayesian implementation with state dependent feasible sets (Q1268574) (← links)
- Coalition-proof implementation (Q1270756) (← links)
- Undominated Nash implementation with collusion and renegotiation (Q1288245) (← links)
- An implementation-theoretic approach to non-cooperative foundations (Q1294004) (← links)
- A nonparametric, efficient public good decision mechanism: Undominated Bayesian implementation (Q1294103) (← links)
- Adaptive dynamics and the implementation problem with complete information (Q1300208) (← links)
- Nash implementation and double implementation: Equivalence theorems (Q1300409) (← links)
- Double implementation in Nash and undominated Nash equilibria in social choice environments (Q1339005) (← links)
- Strategy-proof allotment rules (Q1367676) (← links)
- Implementing coordinated team play (Q1367913) (← links)
- Double implementation by a simple game form in the commons problem (Q1381986) (← links)
- Coordination and discrimination in contracting with externalities: divide and conquer? (Q1421881) (← links)
- Simple mechanisms to implement the core of college admissions problems (Q1577962) (← links)
- Implementation in principal-agent models of adverse selection (Q1584555) (← links)
- Mechanism design when players' preferences and information coincide (Q1650274) (← links)
- Natural implementation with semi-responsible agents in pure exchange economies (Q1684127) (← links)
- Implementation in undominated strategies by bounded mechanisms: the Pareto correspondence and a generalization (Q1729675) (← links)
- Implementation via rights structures (Q1757583) (← links)
- A simple mechanism for double implementation with semi-socially-responsible agents (Q1787988) (← links)
- Treading a fine line: (im)possibilities for Nash implementation with partially-honest individuals (Q1792573) (← links)
- Strong implementation with partially honest individuals (Q1800965) (← links)
- Subgame-perfect implementation of bargaining solutions. (Q1864826) (← links)
- Nash implementation in production economies (Q1893788) (← links)
- Nash-implementation of competitive equilibria via a bounded mechanism (Q1944868) (← links)
- Bayesian implementation with verifiable information (Q2002347) (← links)
- Reaching consensus through approval bargaining (Q2013345) (← links)
- Implementation in undominated strategies with partially honest agents (Q2013373) (← links)
- Rationalizable implementation in finite mechanisms (Q2049477) (← links)
- Strictly strategy-proof auctions (Q2203494) (← links)