Pages that link to "Item:Q462856"

The following pages link to A many-to-many `rural hospital theorem' (Q462856):

Displaying 10 items.

• On the exhaustiveness of truncation and dropping strategies in many-to-many matching markets (Q404743) (← links)
• Implications of capacity reduction and entry in many-to-one stable matching (Q485428) (← links)
• Probabilistic stable rules and Nash equilibrium in two-sided matching problems (Q521881) (← links)
• Lone wolves in infinite, discrete matching markets (Q1651278) (← links)
• Strategy-proofness of worker-optimal matching with continuously transferable utility (Q1651280) (← links)
• Lone wolves in competitive equilibria (Q2217357) (← links)
• Existence of stable allocations in matching markets with infinite contracts: a topological approach (Q2222218) (← links)
• Pareto stability in two-sided many-to-many matching with weak preferences (Q2425160) (← links)
• Equilibria under deferred acceptance: dropping strategies, filled positions, and welfare (Q2437848) (← links)
• Review of the theory of stable matchings and contract systems (Q6039790) (← links)