The following pages link to Parimal Kanti Bag (Q532515):
Displaying 19 items.
- On sequential and simultaneous contributions under incomplete information (Q532516) (← links)
- Match-fixing under competitive odds (Q645638) (← links)
- Strategic R\& D success announcements (Q674230) (← links)
- Bid coordination in split-award procurement: the buyer need not know anything (Q741336) (← links)
- Multi-stage voting, sequential elimination and Condorcet consistency (Q1017796) (← links)
- Simple subscription mechanisms for excludable public goods (Q1306761) (← links)
- Public goods provision: Applying Jackson-Moulin mechanism for restricted agent characteristics (Q1357589) (← links)
- Unraveling in first-price auction. (Q1399519) (← links)
- More on phantom bidding (Q1571055) (← links)
- Harmful transparency in teams (Q1668285) (← links)
- Committee decisions with partisans and side-transfers (Q1863930) (← links)
- Efficient allocation of a ``pie'': Divisible case of King Solomon's dilemma (Q1913283) (← links)
- Prejudice, bias and identity neutral policy (Q2244416) (← links)
- Dominance of contributions monitoring in teams (Q2325669) (← links)
- Money burning in subjective evaluation and limited liability: a case for pay for performance (Q2328554) (← links)
- Group size paradox and public goods (Q2345148) (← links)
- Distributing awards efficiently: more on King Solomon's problem (Q2577440) (← links)
- PEER TRANSPARENCY IN TEAMS: DOES IT HELP OR HINDER INCENTIVES?* (Q4620046) (← links)
- SEQUENTIAL EXPERT ADVICE: SUPERIORITY OF CLOSED‐DOOR MEETINGS (Q5212503) (← links)
