Pages that link to "Item:Q5475057"

The following pages link to Mechanism Design with Interdependent Valuations: Efficiency (Q5475057):

Displaying 29 items.

• Experimentation and project selection: screening and learning (Q263391) (← links)
• Efficient dynamic mechanisms with interdependent valuations (Q290174) (← links)
• On the importance of uniform sharing rules for efficient matching (Q308609) (← links)
• Optimal equity auctions with heterogeneous bidders (Q337790) (← links)
• Interim efficient auctions with interdependent valuations (Q405757) (← links)
• On minimal ascending auctions with payment discounts (Q423778) (← links)
• Dynamic mechanism design with interdependent valuations (Q497945) (← links)
• Mechanism design for the truthful elicitation of costly probabilistic estimates in distributed information systems (Q543619) (← links)
• Contractual solutions to hold-up problems with quality uncertainty and unobservable investments (Q617587) (← links)
• On efficient partnership dissolution under ex post individual rationality (Q639892) (← links)
• Mechanism design goes to war: Peaceful outcomes with interdependent and correlated types (Q839608) (← links)
• Mechanism design with interdependent valuations: surplus extraction (Q878397) (← links)
• Collusion enforcement with private information and private monitoring (Q894017) (← links)
• Individually rational, budget-balanced mechanisms and allocation of surplus (Q928879) (← links)
• Two-sided allocation problems, decomposability, and the impossibility of efficient trade (Q1757552) (← links)
• Efficient bilateral trade via two-stage mechanisms: comparison between one-sided and two-sided asymmetric information environments (Q2164330) (← links)
• Sweet lemons: mitigating collusion in organizations (Q2211471) (← links)
• Merger negotiations and ex-post regret (Q2271375) (← links)
• Implementation without expected utility: ex-post verifiability (Q2296029) (← links)
• Inefficiency in the shadow of unobservable reservation payoffs (Q2348753) (← links)
• Efficient allocations in economies with asymmetric information when the realized frequency of types is common knowledge (Q2363423) (← links)
• The dynamic Vickrey auction (Q2437814) (← links)
• A folk theorem for competing mechanisms (Q2447055) (← links)
• A strict ex-post incentive compatible mechanism for interdependent valuations (Q2451422) (← links)
• Mechanism design with multidimensional, continuous types and interdependent valuations (Q2455672) (← links)
• How to share it out: the value of information in teams (Q5963302) (← links)
• Mechanism design with general ex-ante investments (Q6100484) (← links)
• Efficient sequential screening with informational externalities (Q6107368) (← links)
• A mechanism design approach for multi-party machine learning (Q6111484) (← links)